

Research Article

Democratic Transition and Indonesia-Russia Bilateral Relations from 2001 to 2014: Trends and Emerging Actors

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Abstract

This paper explores and investigates the democratic transition impact on the bilateral relations between Indonesia and the Russian Federation from 2001 to 2014. It argues that the democratic transition affected foreign policy conduct which was indicated by the shift of a state's policy orientation becoming more liberal and gave way to the emerging of new actors in foreign policy conduct. Indonesia and the Russian Federation were experiencing a democratic transition within the same period of time: 1990s post-Soviet Russia and post-authoritarian Indonesia. This paper uses the historical method to explore how Indonesia and the Russian Federation conducted their bilateral relations from 2001 to 2014 and to what extent the democratic transition within the two countries affected the foreign policy orientation and diplomatic conduct among the countries. This paper is expected to enhance the discussion of the democratic transition's impact on foreign policy and diplomacy conduct from the historical approach. It tries to understand the democratic transition as a unique historical event from the actor's perspective, perceived norms, and institutional conventions that shape and constrain the foreign policy and diplomacy actors' behavior. It found that there is a particular configuration and the interplay of democratic institutions and actors that have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes.

Keywords

Democratic Transition, Indonesia-Russia Relations, Democratic Actors, Legislature Oversight

1. Introduction

Democratization is operationally understood as the process of transition to democracy in a community of nations [1], marked by the strengthening of democratic institutions, such as, fair law enforcement, distribution and limitation of power, multiparty political system, direct elections, and freedom of the press. After the Reformation, Indonesia entered a process of transition to democracy characterized by the implementation of a multiparty political system, direct elections, separation of civilian and military powers, and freedom of the press.

Democratization is assumed to have an influence on the policy formulation/making process, especially foreign policy, which is marked by a shift in a country's policy orientation to become more liberal [2-4].

Indonesia is one of the countries that experienced a transition to democracy in the late 1990s. The transition was initiated by the deterioration of the country's economic conditions as a result of the impact of the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, followed by student demonstrations since April 1998,

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and culminated in student demonstrations and violent dissertation riots in May 1998. This event is known as the 1998 Reformation which also marked the beginning of the democratic transition in Indonesia. In principle, Indonesia's democratic transition is a rearrangement of the distribution of power from an authoritarian model to a democratic regulatory pattern, one of which is characterized by the elimination of the role of the military in the government bureaucracy. This was followed by the establishment and strengthening of state institutions that support democratic principles, including the legislature, the judiciary, freedom of the press, and other institutions involved in a more consultative and deliberative decision-making process. This article focuses on the democratization of Indonesia's foreign policy as one aspect of the transition to democracy since the 1998 Reformation, using the case of Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations that have been rebuilt since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991.

The Indonesia-Russia strategic partnership was officially signed on April 21, 2003, during President Megawati Soekarnoputri's visit to Russia. The partnership was rebuilt after the two countries experienced less intense relations when Indonesia was under the New Order regime (1966-1998). Indonesia and Russia gradually built cooperation in the fields of trade, education, economy, technology, tourism and culture. Russia also actively conducts public diplomacy activities in Indonesia through cultural programs, educational exchanges, seminars and exhibitions. After the signing of the strategic partnership during Megawati's presidency, the Indonesian government under Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono's presidency further increased the intensity of cooperation with the Russian government.

From the rational choice perspective, in the early 1990s following the end of Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia was the most eligible great power objectively in terms of national capacity and capabilities and its power influence internationally [5, 6]. Russian Federation, or Russia, was the legal successor of USSR in terms of the biggest territorial expanse, it controlled the strategic nuclear weapons of USSR, it has the biggest population size, it mastered some sophisticated technology, and of course it inherited the Soviet Union wealth [7]. Apart from that, from historical perspective, Russia or the Soviet Union was a close ally of Indonesia during the anti-colonialist movement in the 1950s to 1960s, which supported Indonesia with weapons, financial aid, and also political recognition in the UN [8, 9]. Furthermore, when facing the changing nature of international politics after the end of Cold War, Indonesia must prepare for the rising China in the East Asia with the strategic outlook without either fall into bandwagoning with China or with the US to contain China [10]. Establishing a good relationship with Russia was a plausible choice for Indonesia at that time because from the balance of power standpoint the presence of Russia in the East Asia was prospectively would contain the unilateral like-minded US and the rising China [11, 12].

The closeness of Indonesia-Russia relations factually oc-

curs in the almost simultaneous process of democratic transition in both countries. Indonesia underwent a democratic transition after the 1998 Reformation, beginning with political democratization, which was marked by the restructuring of authority and bureaucracy and continued with the decentralization of power from the central government to the regions. This process was paralleled by the development of a new political culture, indicated by the increasingly open access of society to associate and play politics openly, no longer regulated and supervised by the state in an authoritarian manner. Meanwhile, in Russia, a similar process has been taking place since 1992, right after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, Russia underwent a transition to democracy, beginning in the political sector with the restructuring of the authorities and bureaucracy based on a new constitution in 1993. This process went hand in hand with economic and financial restructuring adopting Western liberal economic management models.

This article analyzes the influence of democratization on Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations in 2001-2014. The democratic transition that occurred in Indonesia and Russia during the same period is assumed to have an influence on the formulation and implementation of foreign policies of both countries. The democratic transition or democratization is positioned as a structural phenomenon that affects the actors formulating and implementing foreign policy. The study employs a historical method, utilizing primary sources such as government regulations and laws, alongside secondary sources like newspapers, textbooks, and scholarly articles. The phenomena being studied is positioned as diplomatic history that analyzed using foreign policy analysis to reconstruct the past events in its entire complexity by inferring as many variables as possible. This article focuses on the emergence of the agency role of certain actors who have transformative power and are able to change the structure of Indonesia's foreign policy during the democratic transition. In other words, this article seeks to analyze the influence of democratization on Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations in the period 2001-2014 within the framework of structuralism methodology that places actors and structures both have interpenetrating power [13]. This paper is expected to enhance the discussion of the democratic transition's impact on foreign policy and diplomacy conduct from the historical approach.

2. Indonesia's Foreign Policy Overview

The Preamble to the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia contains at least two core values that inform Indonesian foreign policy. The first core value is independence as enunciated in the opening sentence. The strong emphasis on independence, whether in opposing all forms of colonialism and imperialism, or in refusing to take part in military alliances led by great powers, has characterized Indonesian foreign policy through the different phases in its political development. The second core value is peace activism, for the Preamble mandates that

the Indonesian government shall play an active role towards the development of a truly just and peaceful world order. It can be said that, from the beginning of the formation on Indonesia's state until now, the core values of Indonesia's foreign policy are preserving independence and active role in foreign politics.

Indonesia's foreign policy from 1945 to 2014 was shaped by a dynamic interplay of evolving domestic factors. In the early years (1945-1949), the primary influence was the struggle for independence from Dutch colonial rule, which instilled a strong desire to assert national sovereignty [14]. Under President Sukarno, Indonesia adopted a non-aligned stance, aiming to stay independent from Cold War blocs. This period was marked by the consolidation of political power and internal stability, as Indonesia sought to position itself as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement, championing anti-colonialism and decolonization in Southeast Asia and beyond. The period of "Guided Democracy" in the 1960s saw Indonesia adopt a more assertive foreign policy, marked by the *Konfrontasi* policy against Malaysia and a drive for regional hegemony [15].

The transition to the New Order under President Suharto in 1966 shifted priorities towards economic stability and regional cooperation, leading Indonesia to be a founding member of ASEAN. Economic liberalization in the 1990s spurred closer ties with global partners, while democratization in 1998 brought new emphases on human rights and international cooperation. In the 2000s, Indonesia faced security challenges, particularly regarding terrorism, which influenced its foreign policy towards greater regional diplomacy and peacekeeping. Thus, from independence to globalization, Indonesia's foreign policy was driven by the quest for national identity, economic imperatives, regional aspirations, and a commitment to security, with domestic influences consistently interacting with global dynamics to shape its diplomatic strategies [16].

Despite the transformation of values over time, the core values of Indonesia's foreign policy remain the same. For Sukarno, the first president of Indonesia, the most important foreign policy theme for Indonesia and other Asian-African countries was the continuing struggle against colonialism and imperialism [17]. Sukarno aimed to keep revolutionary fervor alive by pursuing the complete independence of Indonesia from all forms of imperialism [18]. Rather than compromising its foreign policy by associating with countries openly allied with Western powers, the New Order leaders argued that Indonesia was introducing the independent and active principle into ASEAN [19]. There was some truth to this, as Indonesia did indeed introduce the concept of national and regional resilience into ASEAN, as well as the insistence that regional countries bear the primary responsibility for regional security [20]. President B. J. Habibie, who replaced Suharto and ushered in Indonesia's transition to democracy during 1998-1999, signed Law Number 37 of 1999 on Foreign Relations, which stipulated that all conduct of foreign relations

must adhere to the independent and active foreign policy principle [21].

Indonesia's seventh President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elaborated on the conceptual properties of the independent and active foreign policy. Firstly, it entails independence of judgment and freedom of action, but it must also be constructive. Under his leadership, Indonesia's foreign policy was oriented toward fostering regional and global cooperation while maintaining national sovereignty and strategic autonomy [19]. Yudhoyono emphasized Indonesia's role as a middle power and bridge-builder, advocating for peaceful conflict resolution, multilateral diplomacy, and stronger engagement within ASEAN as the cornerstone of regional stability [17]. His administration sought to strengthen Indonesia's international image through active participation in global forums like the G20, United Nations, and other international partnerships, promoting issues such as democracy, human rights, and sustainable development [19]. By balancing pragmatism and principle, Yudhoyono's foreign policy reinforced Indonesia's position as an influential and respected actor in global affairs [20].

3. The Importance of Russia for Indonesia's Foreign Politics

Diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Indonesia were officially established on March 3, 1950, and on March 19, 1954, Indonesia opened its embassy in Moscow, with Dr. Soebandrio as its first ambassador [22]. On 28 December 1991, Indonesia recognized the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union. The mid-1950s also marked the beginning of extensive political and economic cooperation between the two countries. In September 1956, during President Sukarno's visit to the Soviet Union, a joint Soviet-Indonesian statement was signed, reflecting their shared views on key international issues. They also agreed to build a trade, technical and economic partnership based on equality and mutual benefit. The core of Soviet-Indonesian relations was economic and technical cooperation, based on bilateral intergovernmental agreements. From 1950 to 1965, under President Sukarno, Indonesia's interest in fostering close ties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union grew as the country's anti-imperialist stance strengthened. This initial phase was characterized by high-level meetings and an active exchange of visits between political, military and economic delegations.

However, after the end of Sukarno's "guided democracy" government in 1965 and the rise of an authoritarian military-bureaucratic government, the ideology of anti-communism became the orientation of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policies. The tragic events of September 30, 1965, resulted in the defeat and banning of the Communist Party, the resignation of Sukarno, and the emergence of a military regime known as the New Order, led by General Soeharto. This

fundamentally changed the political landscape of the country. Observers in Soviet society monitored the situation in Indonesia with concern, expressing worries about the future of relations between the two countries.

Indonesia's New Order leaders continued to publicly affirm their commitment to a policy of neutrality and the principles of the anti-imperialist struggle, stating that the banning of the Indonesian Communist Party and the promotion of communist ideology in the country did not indicate hostility towards communist countries. In reality, however, relations with the Soviet Union began to deteriorate in political, economic, cultural and other areas, eventually declining to a formal diplomatic level. At the same time, the government unconditionally recognized the foreign debt incurred by the previous regime and officially confirmed its willingness to pay it off. Moscow expressed interest in increasing Indonesia's exports to the Soviet Union as a way to pay off its debts. However, Jakarta preferred to sell its raw materials and products to capitalist countries. Foreign Minister A. Malik stated, "Only if the Western bloc can no longer absorb Indonesia's export goods, we will divert them to other countries" [23].

The decline in the intensity of Indonesia-Russia cooperation during the New Order did not mean that diplomatic relations between the two countries were disconnected. Indonesian Foreign Minister M. Kusumaatmadja visited the Soviet Union in April 1984 and in a discussion with Soviet Foreign Minister A. Gromyko, they agreed to call for the revitalization of relations between the two countries [24]. In a speech in Vladivostok on July 28, 1986, Mikhail Gorbachev named Indonesia as one of the countries with which the Soviet Union was eager to strengthen relations [23]. President Suharto paid an official visit to Moscow in September 1989, which resulted in the signing of the Statement on the Fundamentals of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Indonesia [25]. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union disrupted the newly revived relationship. Nonetheless, Indonesia quickly recognized the Russian Federation as the legitimate successor to the Soviet Union in December 1991 and continued to repay its debts from past Soviet loans. Unlike many other borrowers, Indonesia repaid all of its Soviet-era loans to Russia by the mid-1990s.

Along with trying to establish diplomatic contacts with the Russian Federation and dealing with domestic problems, Indonesia was faced with another problem. On October 2, 1992, the United States Congress announced that it was removing \$2.3 million in aid to Indonesia under the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program [26]. The withdrawal of this aid was a form of protest by the US Congress against human rights violations in East Timor committed by the Indonesian military that had occurred since the military operation in East Timor in 1975. US President George Bush agreed to the Congressional proposal and signed the proposal on October 6, 1992. The withdrawal of this aid was a protest against Soeharto's authoritarian leadership and

at the same time a military embargo on Indonesia, which at the time was unknown when it would be lifted.

Five years after the US embargo, Indonesia entered a monetary crisis in mid-1997. One year later, Indonesia entered the Reformation period, which was marked by mass riots in almost every city in Indonesia and ended with Soeharto stepping down as President in May 1998. After the 1998 Reformasi, Indonesia entered a new phase of democratic transition, marked by bureaucratic restructuring and decentralization of power. In the period of democratic transition, especially during the presidency of Megawati Soekarnoputri, Indonesia began to open a cooperative relationship for the purchase of weapons with Russia. This choice was a rational alternative after Indonesia was not yet out of the US embargo sanctions. In February 2005, the US began to lift the military embargo against Indonesia [27] but Indonesia continued to strengthen bilateral relations and military cooperation with Russia, for example in the process of purchasing Sukhoi fighter aircraft.

From a rational choice perspective, in the early 1990s following the Cold War's end and the Soviet Union's dissolution, Russia emerged as a prominent global power due to its vast territorial expanse, strategic nuclear capabilities inherited from the USSR, large population, technological prowess, and economic assets. Historically, Russia (and the Soviet Union) was a crucial ally to Indonesia during its anti-colonial movement in the 1950s-1960s, providing military support, financial aid, and political backing in international forums like the UN. Amidst shifting international dynamics post-Cold War, Indonesia sought strategic balance in East Asia, avoiding alignment with either China or the US. Strengthening ties with Russia seemed prudent to counterbalance unilateral influences and emerging powers in the region. Beyond these objective factors, the historical goodwill between Indonesia and Russia/Soviet Union also played a significant role in renewing bilateral relations. This historical backdrop is evident in official statements and documents from both nations since the early 1990s.

The re-establishment of Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations was marked by the establishment of the *Russian-Indonesian Joint Commission on Trade, Economic and Technical Cooperation* based on Presidential Decree No. 113 of 1999. At the ministerial level, the improvement of cooperation was marked by the visit of Indonesian Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to Moscow, September 25-26, 2002. Ivanov noted in his official statement that this was the first visit of an Indonesian Foreign Minister in thirteen years [28]. During this visit Wirajuda met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, to discuss plans for cooperation in many areas, especially trade, in addition to exchanging views on enhancing the role of the UN in global politics, expanding international cooperation to address new threats, especially global terrorism and separatism. In addition to cooperation plans, the meeting between the two Ministers also discussed the planned visit of President Megawati Soekar-

noputri which will be scheduled in early 2003 [28]. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda's working visit marked the beginning of Indonesia-Russia diplomatic dialogues in many potential areas of cooperation and led to the enhancement of cooperation between the two countries into a strategic partnership.

However, a critical question arises regarding the impact of Indonesia's transition to democracy on its relations with Russia: To what extent did Indonesian democratic reforms affect bilateral ties? This research contends that Indonesia's democratic transition had a limited impact, with legislative bodies crucial in advancing initiatives and laws governing state relations. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed Indonesian-Russian state regulations from 2001 to 2014, examining how institutional contexts and bureaucratic perspectives shaped foreign policy goals and regulatory frameworks.

4. Conceptual Framework

In principle, a country's foreign policy is a reflection of its internal conditions, which include internal political dynamics, national interest priorities, and responses to external dynamics. Indonesia's foreign policy shows the phenomenon of the changing course of style and practice as a result of the democratic transition that occurred since 1998 after the *Reformation*. In general, the changes in Indonesia's foreign policy since the 1998 Reformasi have been characterized by a shift from a centralized policy formulation pattern previously dominated by President Suharto, supported by military elites in the bureaucracy [17], to a more consultative and deliberative model of policy formulation [29]. Apart from ideational and leadership dimension, the shifting on Indonesia's foreign policy also took place on the organizational arrangement, as marked by the emergence of the new actor within the foreign policy conduct. One actor that has played a significant role since the transition to democracy is the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR*) as an institution of legislation, regulation, and supervision of executive government power. In other words, Indonesia's democratic transition that began with the 1998 Reformation has changed the traditional view of foreign policy from an executive prerogative to a more egalitarian, consultative and participatory business domain, one of which is characterized by the emergence of the role of new actors such as the DPR in the decision-making process.

The role of legislative institutions as one of the democratic actors in a democratization setting to produce foreign policy has been widely discussed in literature. Malamud and Stavridis [30] identify three roles of parliaments in international affairs: by influencing foreign policy through national parliaments, by conducting parallel diplomatic relations, known as parliamentary diplomacy, and by establishing and empowering parliaments as representative bodies of international, often regional organizations. Essentially, within the framework of democratization of foreign policy, the role of par-

liament is a form of democratic control or institutional constraint [31] over the executive that aims to promote democratic accountability of a government through consultation, discussion, supervision and evaluation mechanisms. The democratic control exercised by parliament, to reduce the notion of executive dominance [32, 33], is also inseparable from the increasingly widespread understanding that foreign policy has become the domain of public policy because it affects, either directly or indirectly, the public at large, such as issues of terrorism, pandemics, climate change, the global financial crisis, and even defense and security matters [30]. In International Relations studies, particularly within the sub-field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), democratic control played by parliament is referred to as 'input' in the foreign policy making of one state.

The analysis of democratic control exercised by parliament in the FPA subfield is an attempt to open up the 'black box' of democracy that still needs to be researched, starting from the observation that 'not all democracies are alike' [34]. It should focus its attention on how different configuration and the interplay of democratic institutions and actors will have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes [35, 36]. According to the FPA perspective, this understanding can be approached by combining institution-centred perspectives, such as the variation of organisation, autonomy, and accountability of democratic institutions, with agency-centred perspectives, that seek to explain how and under what condition that variations affect the policy outcomes and to what extent it imposes constraint to the executive [35]. Within this framework, investigation through the role of parliament in foreign policy making as well as the empirical observation to social-psychological processes that influence leaders' interpretation will help researchers to comprehend how the dynamic of democratic control of foreign policy had taken place.

The role of legislatures in exercising democratic control has been widely researched in the case of war decision-making [37-40] or other external relations than the use of force [41-44]. However, the institutionalist explanation for the legislature as an independent actor within the domain of foreign policy decision making process appears puzzling and calls for an in-depth study [31], especially following the assumption that 'not all democracies are alike' [34]. This concern is increasingly urgent when taking the example of the case that is the focus of this paper, namely the democratic transition in Indonesia, which empirically shows that domestic factors, such as the strengthening of democratic institutions, are still in the early stages. At this stage, the legislature has been given the authority to exercise democratic control over the foreign policy process through the mechanisms of legislation, budget control, consultation, supervision and evaluation of executive policies.

The early stage of Indonesia's democratic transition in this study is assumed to be both a constraint and an opportunity, rather than imperative, to generate explanation about the

agential role of legislature within the Indonesia's foreign policy making process. At the same time, the domestic factors of democratic transition as an environmental constraint, are considered inseparable with international factors during the time, such as the changing structure of international system after the end of Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union that brought enormous impact on how states conduct their international affairs. Thus, explanation requires more detailed knowledge not only of the processes of decision making, but more importantly, of the structural constraints that shape or reshape the choice of decision that made by the policy maker during the time of democratic transition. Using this framework of thinking, this article contributes to the debate on how different configuration and the interplay of structural constraints and democratic institutions and actors will have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes.

5. Indonesia-Russia Relationship and the Role of Legislature

The June 1999 parliamentary elections marked a significant step in Indonesia's shift towards democracy. They were the country's most free and fair elections, revitalizing both the legislature and the broader political system with new legitimacy. Between 1999 and 2002, four major constitutional amendments passed by the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat/MPR*) reshaped Indonesia into a presidential system with a two-chamber parliament. These changes clarified the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches and outlined the roles of each parliamentary chamber. For the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, or DPR), Article 20 of the revised constitution specifically lists responsibilities in law-making, budgeting, and oversight. The second chamber, the Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, or DPD), represents regional interests and can propose and review laws on regional autonomy and natural resource management. However, beyond these roles, it mainly serves in an advisory capacity, resulting in a somewhat asymmetrical structure in Indonesia's legislature.

Southeast Asian legislatures are often seen as mere "rubber stamps," but some studies show a more complex reality. Research suggests that legislatures play a bigger role in political transitions than commonly thought, regardless of whether the government is presidential or parliamentary [45-48]. For example, after Indonesia's regime change, its legislature (DPR) became much more active, passing more laws than during the previous New Order era. While most laws still

came from the executive, the DPR began exercising its oversight role more strongly than its lawmaking role. The DPR met regularly, held public hearings, and used its rights to question government actions. This increased activity was partly due to newly elected legislators wanting to prevent a return to authoritarianism. This shift in power was evident in the DPR's impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001.

Foreign policy issues are examined and discussed in Commission I, a prominent committee in Indonesia focused on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Information. This commission includes 49 members, supported by 20 staff members, and a budget of \$100,000. Meeting three times a week—publicly except for discussions on the intelligence budget—it is well-connected with think tanks, universities, civil society groups, and the media. Because membership remains relatively stable over the five-year legislative term, members can build deep expertise in these areas. Commission I is thus one of the most engaged and outspoken committees in Indonesia's parliament [49].

From 2001 until 2014 there were six presidential decree (see Table 1 below) concerning cooperation between Indonesia and Russia, ranging from culture, investment, combatting terrorism, exploration of outer space, and military and technical. All of these decrees were issued during Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's office, or between 2004 until 2014. Two most important cooperation as indicated from the decree was the cooperation on combatting terrorism and on military and technical. Indonesia and Russia had face terrorism as one of the prominent existential threats domestically, started in the late 1990s in Russia, and in the 2000s in Indonesia. Russia has to deal with Chechen insurgencies during the decade of 1990s in form of suicide bombings of residential building, metro stations, and airport and hostage-taking deadly attack on schools and public domain. While Indonesia has to tackle down the radical Islamic terrorist attack in form of suicide bombing in public area and building. As a sympathetic gesture to the first Bali Bombing, President Putin has sent a telegram to President Megawati on October 13, 2002, to expressed deep condolences. A part of the message from President Putin said: The message said, in part:

"These tragic events have once again confirmed the need for more cooperation and better coordinated efforts by the international community to fight international terrorism, the greatest evil of the 21st century. Please accept my most sincere condolences on the tragedy."

The message was laid a foundation for two countries to further coordination on efforts to fight international terrorism act on the basis of bilateral measures.

Table 1. List of Presidential Decree on Indonesia-Russia Cooperation 2007-2012.

Number	Year	Category	Title
69	2007	Presidential Decree	The Ratification of the Agreement on Cultural Cooperation between the Government of the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the Russian Federation
7	2009	Presidential Decree	The Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Promotion and Protection of Investments
1	2010	Presidential Decree	The Ratification of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes
3	2010	Presidential Decree	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in Combating Terrorism
44	2011	Presidential Decree	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Russian Federation on the Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
46	2012	Presidential Decree	Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the Russian Federation on Military Technical Cooperation

The second issue was military and technical cooperation, following the establishment of Indonesia-Russia Commission on Military Technical Cooperation and increasing the frequency of the joint Commission Meeting Cooperation of Trade, Economic, and Technical, which were first meeting was held in September 2002 in Moscow. It was followed by a series of meeting and bilateral agreements is a defence equipment deal for Indonesia to buy USD 1 billion worth of yet unspecified Russian weapons within the next 15 years which signed in 2004. This agreement signified a successful defence diplomacy of Indonesia after the military embargo imposed by the US on October 1992, in which the US stopped the International Military Education and Training (IMET) that also provide military equipment aid for Indonesia. It also marked a strategic shift of Indonesia's defense diplomacy after the US military embargo imposed in 1992. Crucially, these agreements required parliamentary approval, highlighting Indonesia's democratic process. The Indonesian parliament, particularly the Commission for Defence, played a pivotal role in endorsing these cooperative efforts, aligning with the government's strategic decision to diversify military equipment sources beyond US dependencies.

The agreements on cooperation for combatting terrorism and military and technical assistance from Russia to Indonesia only have the legal status to executed after the government got parliamentary agreement. Parliamentary as the legislative body of the state has played the important role of consultative organ as well as the checks and balances mechanism in democratic setting of public decision process, one of which in the context of Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations was the affirmation of the government choice to cooperate with Russia in diverse field of cooperation. On the plenary session on August 21, 2010, the Commission for Defence of Indonesia

parliamentary, has come to an agreement and gave permission to the government to proceed the military equipment procurement and technical cooperation with the Russian Federation. It means that Indonesia government and legislative body have the same tone in tackling down the strategic challenges of military equipment dependency on the US supply, that previously had been inhibited by the embargo of the US by stopping the International Military Education and Training / IMET program since October 1992.

During the period from 2001 to 2014, Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) played a significant role in responding to Indonesia-Russia cooperation, particularly in areas such as defense procurement and bilateral agreements. Here are some key aspects of DPR's response during that period:

1) Legislative Oversight:

- a. The DPR served as a legislative oversight body, reviewing and approving key agreements and treaties between Indonesia and Russia. These included agreements related to defense equipment procurement and military-technical cooperation. An example is the House of Representatives' approval of a state budget amendment in 2003 to finance the purchase of 4 Sukhoi aircraft and 3 Mi-35 helicopters from Russia and approval for the purchase of 6 Sukhoi SU-30MK2 aircraft in 2012 using the State Budget (*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/APBN*) [50].
- b. Parliamentary committees, such as the Commission for Defence, were actively involved in scrutinizing the terms and implications of these agreements to ensure they aligned with Indonesia's strategic interests and national security priorities.

2) Approval of Defense Agreements:

- a. One of the notable responses from the DPR was its

approval of significant defense agreements between Indonesia and Russia. For instance, the agreement signed in 2004 for Indonesia to purchase USD 1 billion worth of Russian military equipment over 15 years required parliamentary approval.

- b. The DPR deliberated on the strategic importance of diversifying Indonesia's defense procurement beyond traditional suppliers, particularly in light of historical dependencies on US military aid and the embargo imposed in 1992.
- 3) Bipartisan Support and Scrutiny:
- a. Despite occasional debates and differing viewpoints, Indonesia-Russia cooperation generally received bipartisan support within the DPR. Lawmakers recognized the strategic importance of fostering diversified international partnerships while safeguarding Indonesia's national interests.
 - b. The DPR's scrutiny and approval process underscored its role in ensuring transparency and accountability in Indonesia's foreign policy engagements, particularly concerning sensitive issues such as defense procurement and strategic partnerships. For example, in 2003, Commission I of the House of Representatives questioned the way the purchase of 4 Sukhoi aircraft and 3 Mi-35 helicopters was financed using a counter trade mechanism, through a trade-off worth Rp.1.7 trillion covering 30 types of export commodities from Indonesia such as crude palm oil/CPO, tea, and textile products [51, 52].

Overall, Indonesia's House of Representatives during 2001-2014 actively engaged with and responded to Indonesia-Russia cooperation initiatives through legislative oversight, approval processes for bilateral agreements, and strategic deliberations aimed at advancing Indonesia's national security and foreign policy objectives.

6. Legislature as a New Democratic Actor in Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Indonesia's democratic transition, which commenced with the Reformation in 1998, has paved the way for a democratic transition process, particularly in the restructuring of state organizations, the redistribution of authority to be more democratic, and the reorientation of national interests in responding to external dynamics. Indonesia's democratic transition has shifted Indonesia's foreign policy from a centralized policy formulation pattern previously dominated by President Suharto, supported by military elites in the bureaucracy [17], to a more consultative and deliberative model of policy formulation [29] by influencing foreign policy through national parliaments (Malamud and Stavridis 2011). Foreign policy issues are thoroughly examined and debated in the influential Commission I, which focuses on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Information. This Commission is convened three times a

week, with all meetings open to the public, except when discussing the confidential intelligence budget. It has strong connections with think tanks, university research centers, civil society groups, and the media. Since membership of the Commission changes only moderately over the five-year legislative term, members have the opportunity to develop significant expertise in its areas of responsibility. As a result, Commission I stands out as one of the most engaged and outspoken committees in the Indonesian parliament [45].

Using the case of Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations in 2001-2014, this article finds that the House of Representatives emerged as a new actor in Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process with a consultative role through legislative oversight mechanisms. The House of Representatives, through Commission I, has played a legislative oversight role by reviewing and approving key agreements and treaties between Indonesia and Russia, especially in the approval of military arms purchases since 2003. In a deliberative role, the DPR's legislative oversight mechanism can be seen in the DPR's move to form a Working Committee to discuss potential violations in the way it financed the purchase of Sukhoi aircraft and Mi-35 helicopters in 2003 through a trade-off mechanism worth Rp.1.7 trillion covering 30 types of export commodities from Indonesia such as crude palm oil/CPO, tea, and textile products.

The legislative oversight role of Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament in the process of purchasing weapons from Russia also has its own challenges. One example is when in 2011 Commission I of the House of Representatives took issue with the purchase of 7 Mi-17 V-5 helicopters without being equipped with weapons, Global Positioning System/GPS systems, dumper communication devices, and responder transmitters [53]. On the same issue, in 2003, Commission I of the House of Representatives took issue with the purchase of 4 Sukhoi fighter aircraft and 2 Mi-35 helicopters by the Ministry of Industry and Defense, rather than the Ministry of Defense. To address this issue, which was deemed a violation of the constitution, Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament formed a special Working Committee [51]. In a third example, the Indonesian Parliament rejected the government's proposal for a draft law on military technical cooperation between Russia and Indonesia in 2010. In this rejection, the Chairman of Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament, Mahfudz Sidiq, explained that in accordance with Law No. 24/2000 on International Agreements, military cooperation is not required to be ratified through legislation. Mahfud continued that this cooperation can be continued by the government through ratification in the form of a presidential regulation. Although it appears that the legislative oversight authority exercised by Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament is in line with the constitution, it appears that the government's proposals through the Ministry of Defense in the process of purchasing weapons from Russia ultimately always receive approval from the Parliament. Critically, this condition was highlighted by the Deputy Chairman of the Sukhoi Working Committee in 2003, Effendi Choirie, as

a form of the military's exercising power over the government, so that the government seems to always fulfill military requests in terms of purchasing weapons from Russia, especially since the start of the democratic transition period since 1999 [53].

Based on the case of the role of the Indonesian Parliament through Commission I in carrying out the role of democratic control over Indonesia-Russia defense cooperation between 2001 and 2014, it was found that there is a particular configuration and the interplay of democratic institutions and actors that have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes [35, 36]. Commission I of the DPR has performed the functions and roles of legislative oversight, approval of defense agreements, and bipartisan support and scrutiny. On the opposite side, the government through the Department of Defense, as a representation of military interests, has enormous power, even though Indonesia has entered the democratic transition period, in which there should have been a process of shifting more power to the civilian government in the concept of democratic civil-military relations.

This confirms that the strengthening of democratic institutions in Indonesia at the beginning of the democratic transition was still in the process of negotiation between the legislature and the executive, in which the military had a strong influence. Normatively, the DPR as the legislature has carried out its constitutional functions through the mechanisms of legislation, budget control, consultation, supervision and evaluation of executive policies. The early stage of Indonesia's democratic transition in this study has been proven to be both a constraint and an opportunity, rather than imperative, to generate explanations about the agential role of the legislature within Indonesia's foreign policy making process.

7. Conclusion

The Reformasi of 1998 that followed by the June 1999 parliamentary elections marked a significant step in Indonesia's shift towards democracy or the beginning of transition to democracy. They were the country's most free and fair elections, revitalizing both the legislature and the broader political system with new legitimacy. The democratic transition has paved the way for the emergence of the House of Representatives (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, or DPR) as a new democratic actor, especially within the realm of foreign policy decision making process. Principally, DPR has a constitutional right in lawmaking, budgeting, and oversight and on the domain of foreign policy issues, the Commission I of DPR has the right to examine and discuss the foreign affairs, defence, and information. Indonesia's House of Representatives during 2001-2014 actively engaged with and responded to Indonesia-Russia cooperation initiatives through legislative oversight, approval processes for bilateral agreements, and strategic deliberations aimed at advancing Indonesia's national security and foreign policy objectives.

Using the case of Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations in 2001-2014, it found that the House of Representatives

emerged as a new actor in Indonesia's foreign policy decision making process with a consultative role through legislative oversight mechanisms, especially in the approval of military arms purchases since 2003. In a deliberative role, DPR's legislative oversight mechanism can be seen in the DPR's move to form a Working Committee to discuss potential violations in the way it financed the purchase of military equipment. The legislative oversight role of Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament in the process of purchasing weapons from Russia also has its own challenges. Although it appears that the legislative oversight authority exercised by Commission I of the Indonesian Parliament is in line with the constitution, it appears that the government's proposals through the Ministry of Defense in the process of purchasing weapons from Russia ultimately always receive approval from the Parliament. Critically, this condition was highlighted by the Deputy Chairman of the Sukhoi Working Committee in 2003, Effendi Choirie, as a form of the military's exercising power over the government. It can be said that there is a particular configuration and the interplay of democratic institutions and actors that have a differential impact on democratic foreign policy and international outcomes.

Abbreviations

APBN	Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (State Budget)
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
CPO	Crude Palm Oil
DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (Regional Representative Council)
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of Representative)
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GPS	Global Positioning System
IMET	International Military Education and Training
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly)
UN	United Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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