

Nietzschian Considerations About Obstacles to Action in Face of Consciousness – *Bewusstsein* – and Conscience – *Gewissen*

Adilson Felício Feiler

Department of Philosophy, University of the Sinos River Valley, São Leopoldo, Brazil

Email address:

afeiler@unisinos.br

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Abstract: Consciousness, both in its physiological meaning and in its moral meaning, is a feeling of powerlessness, passivity and starvation. With that, destiny appears as an obstacle, in face of which there are resignation, prostration but no jubilant and affirmative coping. Its origins are linked to a movement of internalization of instincts, instead of making exteriorizing them in the form of works of art, which results in a fight against oneself. To the unfinished physiological development and to the resigned struggle, no affirmative, would not a process of self-destruction be linked, which amounts to an abdication of action?

Keywords: Conscience, Nietzsche, Moral, Action

1. Introduction

Consciousness, seen as the bastion of the most complete acknowledgement of the human dimension, has been one of the human dimensions placed under suspicion by Nietzsche. All the generalizable stability, which inspires the state of consciousness, is irreducible to internal phenomena responsible for the maintenance and the growth of human life. If consciousness does not follow the organic dimension that pertains to human life, it represents slandering and belittling.

On the one hand, consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—is the state of consciousness, the being conscious of something that, in Nietzsche's conception, corresponds to the most sophisticated development in human physiology. In translating such states into consciousness, they lose their originality, revealing actions that do not correspond to human singularity. Human actions, expressed in consciousness, reveal only the shallow and risky surface of that which corresponds to the world and to human wealth. On the other hand, the movement of interiorization, typical of conscience—*Gewissen*—due to its appeasing and conciliatory character, leads to the interdiction of the instinct discharge. Instead of acting, it reacts by withdrawing inside.

It does not feel, but resents. Given this passive internalizing dimension, consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—approaches the moral meaning of consciousness, understood as bad conscience—*schlechte Gewissen*. Only as a movement toward the external can consciousness become creative action. The movement of creating is first and foremost an outward movement, with the instincts that become potentializers of creation and not withdrawing inside. Both consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—as triggering actions that falsify internal states, and conscience—*Gewissen*—as actions placed inside, against themselves, in both cases we are facing threats to action as expressions of internal states of the world and human being.

In *The Gay Science* consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—is narrowly related to the pressure of the need of externalizing that which goes inside, that is, making intelligible what one feels and thinks. In order to do so, resources are used that, in being standardized, lose their singular wealth, joining the herd.

In the Second Dissertation of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche develops a psychology of conscience—*Gewissen*. This psychological design is not a methodic

explanation of consciousness, but a character of appeal to it, of a search for it. Therefore, it becomes clear the perversion of instincts as interiority in which the instincts, reduced to inhibition, constitute a field of action against itself. Consciousness is the instinct of cruelty interiorized that prevents its exteriorization, which is reflected in a bestial consciousness, that afflicts itself. Due to this, it is a bad consciousness that makes force, disposition, freedom and action latent, repressed, withdrawn and even drowned in themselves.

It is a self-afflicting cruelty, an unmerciful masochism that imposes itself as guilt. In face of this guilt there is an unpayable debt, which reduces human being to the condition of hostage to that to whom nothing was done, there is no action, only reaction in a feeling of powerlessness. This feeling is endorsed by the interdiction of the flow of forces that, to a great measure, becomes a cause-effect relation, as is the case of the relation between guilt and punishment, a cruelty against oneself, a causal internalization. The flow of forces manifests itself in the relation free of impulses and of affects, free exteriorization of impulses through a non-causal regularity of impulses that makes the discharge of force to be liberated and to create a new configuration of the force. It is the same regularity of the law of Eternal Return of the self-same, which makes all the cycles that passed to eternally come back so that the force is complete with no interdictions. Finality itself is seen as a stimulus to the accumulation of forces experienced in the plenitude of each instant lived. This instant, understood in its eternity and plenitude, ignores the flow of death to life and is realized in the factic completeness of life. In the circle of eternal repetition, each event is full, with no divisions or separations governed by the law of causality, but ruled by the incessant flow of forces that aims into infinity, by the surpassing of all the tendency to inanity and inoperativity.

Our proposal is to show how this perverse mechanism of bad conscience is able to reduce human being to the condition of inoperativity, of non-action, bared of what characterizes him or her as human, without ethics. The only thing left, therefore, is the weight of a powerful external factor—morals—crushing all the disposition and inclination to act. Just as in conscience, physiological consciousness compromises the action by the need of communication in its ardor of making the internal and singular intelligible.

We started by establishing, through the genealogical method, the origins of consciousness both as consciousness in physiological sense—*Bewusstsein*—and as conscience—*Gewissen*—through the process of communicative exteriorization and instinctual interiorization. From the exteriorization of consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—and the interiorization of conscience—*Gewissen*—with falsified and imprisoned instincts, we move on to reflect about the external factors that promote its maintenance, the herd and morals. For short, we point to the disposition for action, the complete force, as a remedy to the falsification of internal states and to the disease known as bad conscience.

2. The Genesis of Consciousness as Communicative Exteriorization and as Instinctual Interiorization

In the aphorism 11 of *The Gay Science* we find Nietzsche's first reflection about consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—considered by the philosopher as the ultimate and most unsophisticated development of the organic body. Instead of consciousness drawing upon the instincts, it draws upon judgments, usually hasty and risky claiming to be eternal and lasting. "They see it as unity of organism. This ridiculous overestimation and miscomprehension of consciousness [...] that, until today, were incorporated only in our mistakes, and where the whole of our consciousness is about mistakes!" Consciousness, for Nietzsche, cannot constitute human being; it is only one of the organs that facilitate its survival, the most unsophisticated and, due to that, the least adequate to direct itself toward the external world. Consciousness is a moving immortalizing nothing, as we can see in a letter Nietzsche sent to Franz Overbeck: "This humiliation for three years, this blow in the face, this non-inexorable, it complicates with the obligation to gain life [...]; on the other hand the consciousness of that is an immortal work that presents itself, that is displayed beside the current nothing: that brings with itself the danger to that which I am not blind. Between us, the worst can be heard at each instant." [1] Consciousness tends to sharpen the strength of the no, aggravating nihilism. Thus, everything that passes through consciousness ends up falsified, as pointed out by Scarlett Marton: "If it points out its falsifying character, it is to warn that which goes through it, ends up falsified." [2] Such falsification impregnates the very body that, as Werner Stegmaier posits, "[...] carries consciousness and provides it with subjects to think about, is, on its turn, very far from being an originary and unconditioned fundamental." [3]

Consciousness grows in the same soil as language, therefore, both consciousness and language are contaminated by gregariness. "For the birth of human consciousness the consciousness of the herd could be used." [4] Everything man thinks is already impregnated by language; by the words one becomes conscious of thought. Vânia Dutra de Azevedo, in commenting the phenomenon of consciousness in Nietzsche, highlights that, for man to be part of society, he needs to cultivate the ability to communicate and consciousness "[...] his insertion in society requires communication and, therefore, consciousness." [5] Man is pressed to manifest his thought into words and when this happens, thought becomes uncharacterized of what is most intimate, personal and singular to it. In other words, thought, through the filter of consciousness and language, becomes prey to falsifications. Falsification, promoted by consciousness, operates divisions and oppositions between man and animal; what, in itself, would not mean, according to Nietzsche, any difference. The gregarious dimension that makes consciousness arise in the biological or risky and

levelling judicative¹ sense, although it has its particulars, is not detached from the meaning of consciousness—*Gewissen*—in the moral sense. Before that, however, both meanings constitute, as remarked by Antonio Edmilson Pascoal, a whole, a body that “in Nietzsche, does not designate a pile of bones, muscles, organs, etc. [...] a set that includes the instincts, impulses and a whole inner world that developed in man due to his history and of its process of moralization of customs.” [6] The relationship that is established between consciousness in its physiological and moral sense is confirmed by what Nietzsche calls psychophysiology. (In the beginning of this same aphorism, Nietzsche shows that psychology, up to the moment, was attached to morals. Thus, the themes of physiology, of psychology and of morals constitute a field of interconnection. As much as Nietzsche wants to develop, in this aphorism, a psychology linked to the theme of the will to power, liberating it from moral prejudices, the latter, in any way, becomes present in all the ambits of Nietzschean reflection as one of the most serious problems to be faced. The fundamental genesis of the phenomenon of bad conscience is situated in the meaning conscience—*Gewissen*—beyond the second dissertation of *On a Genealogy of Morality*. Nietzsche prefigures this theme in his writing *Beyond Good and Evil. Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, in the aphorism 12 when he shows how the human psyche was established, involved in the concept of soul, through its atomistic comprehension. In this respect, Nietzsche expresses himself saying that it is “[...] the soul’s atomism. Let it be allowed that this term is designated as the creed that sees the soul as something indestructible, eternal, indivisible, as a monad, an atom: this belief should be eliminated from science.” [7]

Beyond this monadologic, closed, self-centered and static comprehension of the soul, it forms the bases for the understanding of an open, plural, de-centered and dynamic soul. In abandoning a conception of the substantialist kind, Nietzsche adopts a dynamic conception in which force acquires a fundamental role. That classical subject is deconstructed in favor of the notion of the body as a battle field, which results in an instable balance. This instability reveals a virtue of honesty with oneself, in face of which there is no possibility of a beyond, but a limit configured to earth, demystified of the notion of soul. In relation to that notion of soul, Nietzsche remarks: “The path is open to new versions and refinements of the hypothesis of the soul and concepts such as ‘mortal soul’, ‘soul as the plurality of the subject’ and ‘soul as social structure of impulses and affects.’” [8]

If the body is understood as a battle field, there is room only for both the dissolution of the classic principle of individuation and for the disintegration of the “I.” Remédios

Ávila, in commenting on the disintegrated “I” in Nietzsche, reminds us that it reflects the plurality of the body, composed of tensions that compose a battle field. [9]

The soul, understood as a monad closed within itself in a solipsistic unit, is consciousness itself as it operates the movement of interiorization. From this interiorizing self-consciousness results all types of delusions and fictions. In this sense, the social structure of impulses and affects is closed within itself. Alberto Carlos Onate, about this process of interiorization of consciousness, posits: “The ‘interiorization’ is the result of an immense conciliating, appeasing effort, which soothes and ends up precluding the discharge of instincts favorable to violence and conquest; deprived of the channel of external expression, they resign to develop an internal periplus in whose breach the conscious state is established.” [10]

This phenomenon of interiorization equals a vulcan that, instead of expelling ashes, lava and fire from the top of its crater, swallows them inside itself. The effects of this are those of a war that afflicts itself: a trap that catches the one who prepared it. To the same extent that all the instinctual charge, when exteriorized, affects the movement in the contrary direction, behind, that is, inside, causes the most harmful self-destruction.

The origin of bad conscience consists in an abrupt, fatal and unavoidable process, a violent cut that, as the establishment of a strong State, imposes itself and subdues. Bad conscience makes latent the force and the instinct of freedom. It leads “[...] this instinct of freedom to be repressed, withdrawn, closed in intimacy, able to unburden only in itself: this, only this, was, in the beginning, bad conscience.” [11] Conscience consists, as remarked by André Luiz Mota Itaparica, in the “[...] introjection of aggressive impulses.” [12] These impulses oppressively internalized as a punishment to those who resist the rules of the herd, convert themselves in conscience, a subject that is openly developed in the second dissertation of *On the Genealogy of Morality*. The theme of consciousness refers back to the obedience to moral customs that is deduced from The Dawn: “(...) are our judgments and our moral values as well only images and fantasies about a physiological process known by us [...] to designate certain nervous stimuli? That all this that we call consciousness is a commentary more or less fantastic.” [13] By the imposition of judgments and moral values and the resulting punishment to those who do not follow has its origin in conscience. From the field of consciousness, permeated by the natural and normative, one deduces, as reminded by Christopher Janaway, [14]. “[...] enough room for the conception of value.” In the field, referred to valuing, conscience was being molded, from a very early time, between creditor and debtor. The punishment occupies its place if the debtor does not pay his debt to the creditor. In the punishment there is the externalization of what was interiorized as bad conscience. The latter consists in the acknowledgment by the debtor of the weight of his guilt. “The development of guilt, in Nietzsche’s interpretation, is directly related to the advent of the Christian God, since he

1 We have decided to name Consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—in addition to physiological, for being a more unsophisticated product of physiology, also with a judicative meaning. By this meaning, human being, due to the pressure of the need to communicate inner states, do so as hasty judgments, that do not correspond to its singular legitimacy.

makes man responsible for a fault, making the very notion of responsibility something guilty” [15].

Guilt, in face of the commandments that follow from Christian morality, prevents the opening, maintains inertia, subjugates and represses. This theme of instinctual repression, later developed by Freud in psychoanalytic clinic, has an important factor to help, through the word, that liberates all that unconscious load that prevents its exteriorization. If in consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—in its levelling judicative sense, whose gregarious conformation lies in thought and language, in the moral sense the linguistic expression would be a type of liberation of that which is most genuine, personal and singular. Only by its exteriorization freedom stops being a propelling factor of potential creation bared of all that cruelty, repressed and interiorized with the aim of domesticating, as the State did. However, human being, from bad conscience, elevates his martyrdom to its height, through the religious supposition that is imposed as an unpayable debt, becoming an eternal hostage of God’s control. This same feeling, of being in the hands of one whose doubt cannot be paid, acts as a disease that infects and poisons. Marcelo Giglio Barbosa reminds us that “[...] consciousness appears, in this context, as a factor of sickness and degeneration.” [16]

This symptom that permeates the minds of those who are eager to bring to memory situations such as slavery as an unpayable doubt, would be bringing to memory the need of doing justice as a salutary movement to the exteriorization of that repressed instinctual load, or, on the contrary, they would be moved by a bad conscience. Would they be, however, incapable of externalizing that genuine singular instinctual charge that turns against itself? We seek to answer this question or, at least, problematize it through resulting considerations about the herd and morals in the second chapter.

3. The Herd and Morality as Obstacles to the Externalized Singular Action

Consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—is something disposable. In the words of Oswaldo Giacóia Júnior, “(...) there is no better way to become aware of this disposability of consciousness than through physiology and zoology,” [17] since, in all these fundamental processes to human life, such as thinking, wanting, feeling, consciousness is absent. Where does the need of refinement of consciousness come from, then? It is not other than “[...] that that inscribes consciousness as a function of the ability to communicate.” [18] This need of communication is assessed in terms not only individual, but also of a race and/or nation. Therefore, “[...] consciousness in general only developed under the pressure of the need of communication.” [19] It is exactly in name of survival of groups, societies and species that communication came to be developed. Once more, the mark of the herd follows the DNA of consciousness through the necessity of communication. Before communicating, one feels the need of reflecting the

content of what will be expressed.

Therefore, one knows that which one wants, that which can be communicated from those previous states, that are our animic states and our mental representations. Words result only from that which one is conscious about. It is important to highlight that being conscious and being rational are not synonymous. “Concisely said, the development of consciousness (not reason, but only the becoming-conscious-of-oneself of reason) go hand in hand.” [20] However, even if language is not equaled in the same level as reason, which would be a much bigger problem, it performs a process of rendering common, equaling that which in itself is different, through the abstractions of the singularities. “[...] as is visible, consciousness is not exactly part of man’s individual existence, but of that which in him is of the nature of community and herd. [21]

It is due to that which is common, egalitarian and equalizer that consciousness—through language—eliminates that which is different and singular. Through the elimination of those personal, individual characters that delineate human being that which constitutes him is resigned: his ability to act. About this aspect of action, Nietzsche is emphatic: “Our actions are, deep down, all of them, personal in an incomparable manner, unique, unlimitedly individual, there is no doubt about it; but as soon as we translate them in consciousness, they no longer seem to be so...” [22]

Consciousness acts as a uniformizing filter on personal characters, eliminating its differences and those differences that are fundamental for the constitution of action. Through consciousness, human being acts as a herd, losing that which is unique and singular in him or her. Through what is unique and individual, man, in his docility to the world, allows it, in its constant coming into being, as will to power, go through its pores. “The will to power is exerted over numerous microscopic living beings that form the organism in which each one wants to prevail in the relationship with the others.” [23]

The product of this incessant going through of the will to power in the beings is the creation of new forms and perspectives.

Through consciousness, the docility to earth, which is openness to create, and therefore to act (who?) is blocked by the imposition of egalitarian and standardizing models, dictated by that necessity of reflection of the contents to be linguistically expressed to “[...] render intelligible its necessities.” [24] Instead of man being a singular and creative expression of the wealth of the world’s coming into being, though the filter of consciousness, he ends up being a receptacle to that which, in the world, is more superficial; “[...] the world we can render conscious, is only a world of surfaces and signs.” [25] Rendering conscious prevents the manifestation of what is singular, namely those inner animic states charged with creative vital force. These animic states and/or instincts constitute an action, without end, without target, without goal and without consciousness. Anna Hartmann Cavalcanti, in her study about the genesis of the conception of language in Nietzsche, says “[...] that instinct,

understood as such, is not the result of a certain bodily organization or a spiritual mechanism previously disposed by nature, but an unconscious activity of the spirit.” [26]

Language consists in a process of bringing to consciousness the unconscious animic structure that underlies thought. The abstraction of language contributes to the development, intensification and maintenance of conscious thought, representing a frontal shock to the unconscious animic load, resulting in crystallization of action, as creative forces that, according to Nietzsche, unmake the illusion of illusory concepts, such as that of soul, unity and cognoscent subject. According to Parmeggiani, “[...] Nietzsche submits the critique of gernal presuppositions of the cogito: the self-conscious I as the cause of thinking and the image of thought.” [27] The I think offers, according to Nietzsche, a simplified and, thus, limited and arbitrary interpretation of the thinking activity, as part of the world of life. This implication occurs by the equaling of standardization of that which, in itself, cannot be standardized, from the relation of causality of that which is the set of potential affects. The simplification through which consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—in its physiological meaning is reduced is abdication of action, since these standardized and egalitarian models prevent the relations of the force, the plurality and the originality of the wealth of inner differences responsible for the movement of creation. This characteristic is also shared by conscience—*Gewissen*—in its moral meaning, not so much by preventing the action through the levelling of the unequal, but for preventing the externability of action. Thus, in both meanings of consciousness, action is blocked.

Bad conscience—*schlecht Gewissen*—as we have seen, has its origin in the constitution of guilt, and the latter, on its turn, demands a debt that appears as unpayable: “[...] the debt reaches enormous heights, becomes unpayable, becomes eternal: the responsibility-debt becomes responsibility-guilt.” [28]

Thus, the result is passive resignation in face of something unreachable. Each and every disposition to act is prevented, reaction being the only thing left. He who reacts does not act nor produces and even prevents, as a contagious disease, others to act. Guilt, therefore, acts in the sense of weakening, destabilizing, enfeebling, degenerating. It does not allow the movement from inside to outside to occur; on the contrary, it acts in the sense of moving, even more, in the direction from the outside to inside, occasioning a lethargic plunge into the nihilistic vortex, a nihilistic plunge based on the movement of interiorization of forces, as pointed out by Pascoal: “[...] bad conscience has its origin in the interiorization of active forces from the strong man.” [29]

Even if nihilism may be theoretically possible, in the sense that it can be theoretically spoken of, this cannot occur with the psychological nihilism, due to the risk of a reduction to a feeble and depressing submission unable to create. Because of that, psychologically, nihilism is impossible. Bad conscience activates the psychological device, undermining, from the bases, all the possible capacities of the human being seeking to overcome himself. Here we are led to agree with

Pascoal about an “active bad conscience.” [30]

Which may sound contradictory. Bad conscience is active in the sense of, through psychological devices, preventing human capacity of overcoming everything that debases and belittles. In face of that, one is led to ask what are the devices (expedients) that bad conscience uses to lead forward the psychological debilitation of human being. These expedients are all of those external mechanisms that impose themselves as limits, interdictions, laws and commandments under the name of morality. Thus, if bad conscience acts in the moral sphere, we cannot agree with Pascoal when he affirms that, primitively, “[...] bad conscience can be understood as a psychological, or even pathological, but not a moral phenomenon.” [31]

On the other hand, we advocate that the phenomenon of morality is something so determining in Nietzsche’s thought that it is present since its genesis. The difference is in the emphasis placed on morality in the different “phases” of his writings. Nietzsche perceives how morality is felt from civil organizations, led by the institutional weight of the State with its laws and decrees and, mainly, by religious institutions.

The religious leaders frequently named ascetic priests use the stratagem of awakening the feeling of guilt, that takes its shape as sin, that is, “[...] transfiguring the feeling of guilt in consciousness of sin and fomenting the wish of expiation.” [32] Sin is the reinterpretation of animal bad conscience, that is, of cruelty turned backwards. In face of this situation, human being is led to search within him or herself the cause of his or her suffering. Bad consciousness is the past that at every moment comes back to plague the ears in the shape of resentment.

The one who resents afflicts him or herself, puts him or herself in the position of one who has no escape, sinking more and more in the merciless vortex of nihilism of one’s own interior. And the worse is that he or she, in this state of lethargy, provokes the other to do the same. Resentment is a posture that may become present in the situations we judge as the most sound and just, as in the case of the vindication of rights by some minorities. A victimistic argument may lead to trigger, then, a feeling of guilt due to a done did that is understood as unpayable. If a debt is unpayable, there is no other feeling but that of the one who returns backwards, goes back within him or herself and reacts. He or she is not able to feel but to resent, since there is no exit visible, only a turning back upon oneself annihilating and unable to create.

It is not about exempting people from their responsibilities with the commitment with the so called minority causes. However, it is necessary to act according to a criterion, since, on the contrary, in addition to losing the cause, one ends up losing oneself. Thus, it is visible how subtle are the mechanisms of morality, which in most cases acts unconsciously so as to catch by surprise and assault.

Given that mechanisms and devices of morality tend to weaken and enfeeble by the crystallization and ossification to predetermined patterns, the antidote for this situation would be to unblock such standardizations that allow the performance of a movement outward. Well, if bad conscience

is a consideration of its natural propensities with a bad look, hostile to life and slanderous to the world, the exit to revert this situation is in the conversion of the look, in a good look and attached to life that welcomes the world. Morality inhibits, prevents the action and forbids behavior, triggering bad consciousness. Due to this, the antidote against the disease of bad conscience is in the disposition to action. It is asked: how does the action impact, internally, as a device, to restrain the malefic effects of the instinctual falsification of bad conscience?

4. Action as a Device to the Overcoming of Instinctual Falsification and Bad Conscience

In falsifying the singular internal instincts, consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—prevents action in the sense of, through it, translating genuine inner states, products conventionalized by the herd. One typical trait of consciousness is its falsifying character, “[...] that which passes through it ends up falsified.” [33]

This falsifying levelling, promoted by consciousness, in the shape of language, has in the action a break of this hurried generalization. Human actions, due to being unique, individual and singular, do not surrender to the pattern, to generalized communality, to vulgarity. They, in their dynamicity, constantly renew all that pretends being fixed and reducible to become fluid. This necessity of fluidity bumps into the dimension of the fundament, responsible for inverting the cause-effect relation: “[...] the cause gains consciousness later than the effect [...]; the cause is imagined after the effect has happened.” [34] The centrality of the cause as the fundament of all the actions is linked to memory, based on the past experiences, and to fictions, based on falsifications. By the interposition of a fundament previous to action, consciousness, through language, presupposes judgments destructive of the fluidity of internal experience. Just as the fluidity, promoted by the action in consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—makes the inner states expressed in their singularity, the fluidity, promoted by the action in conscience—*Gewissen*—promotes its exteriorization.

Bad conscience is a synonym of interiorization of human being, a turning back within oneself, against oneself. This interiorization implies the elimination of the ability to act in human being. A being that does not act loses that which basically characterizes it: its impulse for action. If a being does not act it makes the contrary movement: reacts. Resentment is characterized as the product of human incapacity provoked to act by biological weakness, in face of the injuries and all the type of challenges. It may also be, as posited by Pascoal, “[...] a form of action. In the case of the ‘morality of resentment’ [...] a form of valuing that constitutes itself from weakness.” [35]

The acting of the strong is, on the contrary, that which is placed in the position directed toward life: living is acting,

allowing internal instinctual drives to exteriorize themselves, the product of this externalization being the work of art.

By acting all the internal forces that place themselves in the position of extravasation are activated. This externalizing movement is expressed as creation. In the process of creating is implicit the movement of overcoming obstacles and paradigms that prevent the new. Due to this, the action implied in the process of creation is a *quantum* of force that, once directed outward, becomes proactive. The contrary would be a restrained force, which launches itself toward the interior, against itself, a conscious force that struggles and injures, provoking the feeling of impotence, passivity, submission and inanition.

Action demands joy, transforming the obstacle into solution, punishment into prize, sickness into health, lethargy into change, destiny into possibility. Through action the wealth of what it is revealed—the plenitude of life, which consists in instants of tragic tension, an organic whole in movement. Action is an instinctual whole that is life, marked by the struggle between drive manifestations, Apollonian and Dionysian, which permeate all of Nietzschean philosophizing. In the wake of this tragic vision of life, Nietzsche, according to David Hoy’s reading, searches “[...] an established pathway of life—which has already been collapsed.” [36]

If the tragic marks all of Nietzsche’s philosophizing, then the critique to the very conception of consciousness is revealed as a true deconstructive enterprise in face of the dogmatic metaphysics and the Judeo-Christian morality. With this, the very notion of subject loses all the meaning it was endowed with. Given the deconstructive nature of this though, it justifies only through the creating affirmation, a reason why all the theories of force and will of power are of the utmost importance.

Nietzsche presents the essence of force not through physics, which explains it through its effects, but through the belief that there are things. He characterizes force as “dynamic quanta, in a relationship of tension with all the other dynamic quanta.” [37] Force is a dynamic *quantum* in which the causal relation is extrapolated, since it is characterized as simple acting² toward a provisional unit. Each of these units emerge through the fight with other bodies, which, in acquiring a certain firmness, adjusts with the intention of “[...] expanding its force (- its will to power) and to repel all that resists its expansion.” [38] Therefore, every living being has a natural inclination to the increase of forces and not self-conservation.³ Living, in this dynamics of the will to power, is not a tendency toward conservation, nor duration, but an overcoming. And, as Robert Pippin stresses, it is typical of living the facing of all kinds of force and resistance, therefore the need “[...] of recognition and resistance that Nietzsche praises when he discusses self-

2 “Concept of activity (Split between cause and effects).” (Nietzsche, 1999, p. 259).

3 “The physiologists should reflect, before establishing the impulse of self-conservation as the cardinal impulse of an organic being. A living creature wants, above all, to give vent to its force—life itself is will to power” (Nietzsche, 1999, p.27).

overcoming.” [39]

In face of the reality of forces, life is action from which the demand of truth of interpreting and evaluating arises. And in each interpretation and evaluation, new and multiple interpretations and evaluations are issued, in a movement renewed at every instant. Through the creating impulse, life is affirmed and action exteriorized; with this, the concepts of “I,” “soul,” “substance,” “being,” “subject,” bases of the notion of consciousness, are deprived of their determination and stability. Action imposes itself in face of the petricity of all the determinations and stabilities, occasioning a true cataclysm in that in other times immutable primacy of consciousness. Instead of consciousness, of that movement inward, Nietzsche introduces the faculty of forgetfulness, providing the deeply savoring the instant of the full present. The not forgetting occasions the carrying of a debt that is never payed, of a pain that is never relieved, of a wound that is never healed. But would that faculty of forgetting not be in a position contrary to life and to forces, insofar as, in abandoning the memory of the past, it would abandon all the learning as well, which is crucial for the enrichment of life? This faculty of forgetting is understood, important insofar as, far from erasing the memory of the past, does not allow its marks to block the present. That is, that the making of memory does not block the action, but, on the contrary, potentialize it to generate more action. The therapy that Nietzsche the psychologist offers, according to Oswaldo Giacobina, is that of narcotizing the suffering consciousness through self-overcoming that “(...) is done by the experience of resentment under the light of potency.” Through the excess of force health is promoted beyond an inert and incurable prostration. This accumulation of forces does not admit stagnation or targets to be met understood as the final stage, but, as Walter Kauffman reminds us, “[...] the target of humanity cannot be found in the end, but only in the highest of specimens.” [40]

Thus, forgetting is not the same as not making memory, but preventing its marks to interfere in the ability to act and, for this reason, to create. Otherwise, life would be seriously compromised. The faculty of forgetting acts as a relief of consciousness, restituting freshness and fluidity so that adequate answers may be given to the stimuli that are liberated. Forgetting is conceived, therefore, as an active force, which leads past experiences not to penetrate in consciousness, in the sense of a psychic assimilation. Forgetting inhibits in the sense of, on the one hand, rendering conscious past experiences and, on the other hand, allowing the forces of instincts to act. Well, not forgetting, memory, consciousness interiorize, imprison, falsify the instincts and repress them as well, resulting only in appearance, surface and bad conscience. This imprisonment of bad conscience, in generating a subject behind the action, negates the multiplicity of forces in interaction in the human organism. For this reason, one needs to overcome “[...] general states of pleasure and displeasure interpreted according to the logic of casualty, in a process commanded by imagination that attributes, at the same time, causal efficacy and moral

signification to entities or fictional beings: spirits, gods, substantial wills, consciousness, above all moral conscience (*Gewissen*).” [41]

It is in the instinctual and animic play of forces that the causal limits are deconstructed and life reaches its plenitude in transvalued instants. In these, the subject is nothing but gregarious fiction dictated by consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—, surface, sign, moral prejudice and bad conscience—*Gewissen*.

5. Conclusion

The considerations made helped us to perceive how consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—and conscience—*Gewissen*—constitute obstacles for the manifestation of action. Even though each meaning of consciousness has its specificity, be it through the physiological and judicative/linguistic ambit of consciousness that loses all internal singularity, be it through the moral ambit, which imposes obstacles to the exteriorization of action, both meeting in one common point: the commitment of action. Through consciousness in both meanings, the action meets obstacles to its manifestation.

Consciousness—*Bewusstsein*—manifests itself through the necessity of communication and, with that, its content is externalized as levelling to the patterns established by the herd. The action resulting therefrom does not correspond to the interior singular instincts; they are falsified judgments. Conscience—*Gewissen*—reduces everything to the ambit of disincentive, dejection and the lack of peace. Therefore, instead of the intellectual load projecting itself outward, it withdraws inside, interiorizing in a frontal attack against itself, a self-conspiracy.

The satisfaction of the needs of the herd acts in the sense of turning action into a mass of maneuver in loss of what fundamentally characterized the action, its plural, singular and instinctive load. The action that derives from this phenomenon of consciousness is fiction, which does not reflect the world and human being in its singularity. Conscience has its commitment of action in the withdrawing of the instinctive forces to the apathetic and passive ambit. Morality represents the weight of guilt that returns to disturb at every instant, preventing the instinctual forces to exteriorize.

Thus, it is only through the potentialization of action that the inverse movement can be performed; that of making all that instinctual load show in its singular originality and be directed outward in a process characterized by creating. However, for the device of action to be expressed, the activation of the faculty of forgetfulness is needed. This, far from being the annulation of memory, is characterized as the not-letting-one-be-determined by the contagious wounds of the past. It is on this level that forgetfulness may facilitate the triggering of action, which, in creating, completes each instant in life. This instant is composed of a multiplicity of forces in combat, whose action and reaction establish hierarchies, as modes of acting of the forces. From this plurality of forces in tension the vital body is originated. However, for the expansionist process of creation to be

maintained, it is necessary that the active forces dominate the reactive forces. In acting fortuitously, such forces dissolve the conceptual unities of the “I” and the “subject,” since the action occurs devoid of intentionality, it simply acts, acts out, in the sense of fighting, imposing, transvaluing. The instinctual field that characterizes Nietzsche’s philosophy, whose forces maintain and promote life, is necessarily oriented toward action.

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