



# Impact of Agricultural Policy Fluidity on Trust Among Youth Coffee Farmers in Tanzania: An Application of Difference in Difference Method

Rogers Andrew<sup>1,\*</sup>, Provident Dimoso<sup>1</sup>, Judith Namabira<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Department of Rural Development and Regional Planning, Institute of Rural Development Planning, Dodoma, Tanzania

<sup>2</sup>Department of Development Finance and Management Studies, Institute of Rural Development Planning, Dodoma, Tanzania

## Email address:

[randrew@irdp.ac.tz](mailto:randrew@irdp.ac.tz) (R. Andrew), [pdimoso@irdp.ac.tz](mailto:pdimoso@irdp.ac.tz) (P. Dimoso), [j.namabira@irdp.ac.tz](mailto:j.namabira@irdp.ac.tz) (J. Namabira)

\*Corresponding author

## To cite this article:

Rogers Andrew, Provident Dimoso, Judith Namabira. Impact of Agricultural Policy Fluidity on Trust Among Youth Coffee Farmers in Tanzania: An Application of Difference in Difference Method. *International Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*. Vol. 10, No. 1, 2022, pp. 7-16. doi: 10.11648/j.ijebo.20221001.12

**Received:** January 2, 2022; **Accepted:** January 17, 2022; **Published:** January 21, 2022

---

**Abstract:** The present paper assesses impact of agricultural policy fluidity on youths' trustworthiness in abiding to contracts with private investors in the coffee sector in Tanzania. In the 2018/19 coffee season, the government provided onset directives on marketing to institutionalize cooperatives to be a sole coffee collector from farmers unlike before the 2018/19 coffee season whereby farmers groups and private traders dominated. This paper defines trust as upkeep of the agreements between youth coffee farmers (a principal) and farmers groups and private investors (an agent) to supply coffee to private investors through groups albeit regulation fluidity created loopholes for youth farmers to diverge coffee to other cooperatives. Data used were collected from coffee farmers and respective cooperatives in the Southern highland of Tanzania and the Difference in Difference (DID) method was applied to analyze the impact of agricultural policy fluidity on trust among youth coffee farmers. The results indicate that the agricultural policy fluidity deterred trust among youth coffee farmers relative to elders. The results indicate that the 2018/19 coffee marketing changes impacted the decline in coffee collection with an Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) of about 18.2kg of coffee parchment among youths relative to elders. In addition, it was revealed that farmers groups (new cooperatives) which had no obligations to pay back loans experienced a boom in coffee collection relative to their counterparts. It is recommended that since agricultural investments are long term, any change in agricultural policies, laws and regulations has to have preparatory phase to allow investors, cooperatives, farmers and government units participating in the value chain to determine possible negative effects and develop strategies of mitigating such effect. Cooperatives have to work with responsible department at district level to institutionalize mistrust measures restricting farmers from selling coffee to other cooperatives. One of the measures will be restricting cooperatives from receiving coffee from non-member farmer.

**Keywords:** Impact, Trust, Policy Fluidity, Difference in Difference, Youth Farmers, Coffee, Tanzania

---

## 1. Introduction

Trust has been instrumental to sustained economic cooperation in any economic activities; be it agrarian or multinational economic systems and is a new instrument for value production in the global economy is the cooperative mode of organization characterized as interdependent, long-term relations among autonomous organizations [1]. Hardin, R. [2] Defines trust as an "encapsulated interest: one actor trusting another to complete a specific action out

of self-interest, whether it is because the actor values the other person's welfare, closely identifies with that individual, or wishes to maintain a relationship with that person. Whereas [3] sees trust as a class of actions in which we choose to take or not take risks and his focus is on uncertainty and vulnerability in trust relations. It is widely accepted among experts in different scientific fields that the concept of trust presumes the presence of uncertainty or risk

[4] and it is a possible tool for business actors to cope with the uncertainty or risk in exchange relations, behind which lie information and time problems [5]. Furthermore, [6] argues that trust occurs when the business partner expects the other to behave predictably and in a mutually acceptable way. Discussing the types of trust [6] distinguished – among others – contractual trust and competence trust. (a) Contractual trust: based on the mutually accepted norm of honesty and keeping promises, one of the contracting parties expects the other to keep his promises. (b) Competence trust: the business partner trusts that the other has the appropriate technical and managerial competence to fulfill the commitments. Studies by [7, 8] revealed that trust is important in achieving productivity in developing economies. Accordingly, [9] stresses that virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time. Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. [10] assert that, a prerequisite for the successful development of market economies would be to depart from closed group interactions and to enlarge exchanges to anonymous others in which trust and trustworthiness appear as the keystone for successful economic development. In accordance, investing in trust should be considered as a new and central approach to restoring economic growth and reinforcing social cohesion, as well as a sign that governments are learning the lessons of various crises witnessed in middle and low-income countries [11]. Citing entrepreneurs and investors, [12] argue that both of them need to trust that their property will be protected and that they will have at least short returns commensurate with their risk taking and that without such trust, an economy stagnates. Besides, trust is "key" because they encourage marketers to (a) work at preserving relationship investments by cooperating with exchange partners, (b) resist attractive short-term alternatives in favor of the expected long-term benefits of staying with existing partners, and (c) view potentially high-risk actions as being prudent because of the belief that their partners will not act opportunistically [13].

## 2. Theoretical Background

### 2.1. Trust

Trust alone cannot support the daily activities of individuals or the functioning of economic life and therefore it must be legitimately grounded in the trustworthy actions of those individuals and institutions [14]. According to [15], the legal framework reduces risks, thereby reducing the irrationality and uncertainty by strengthening trust and eliminating monopolies and entanglement of human relationships and offers greater potential for economic integration. Mechanisms such as shared information, reputational effects, enforceable contracts, and insurance schemes are used to promote trust among people in a context of uncertainty and vulnerability [10]. Trust is a key element and decisive factor in the

cooperation relationship, which allows real commitment and confidence among the partners to develop a vision for the long-run [1]. Dishonesty turns trust into gullibility, thus mechanisms linking interpersonal trust with institutional success refer implicitly to honesty and civic morality: offering a contract is a matter of trust, and performing it, a matter of trustworthiness [16]. However in some cases, there may be a serious flawed cooperative working relationship because of untrustworthiness of any part which will doom any agreement to failure and hence regulatory framework firms existing trusts. According to [17], rational choice scholars have advanced arguments about trust, seeing it as rooted in expectations about individual interests. The purpose of the government regulatory framework is to ensure that the built trust is maintained to sustain cooperation [18-20]. The regulations also play a function of ensuring that a level playing field with other types of business organizations is guaranteed and maintained. Looking at a socially heterogeneous society in which there are intergroup conflicts of interests, [17] argues that informal mechanisms like trust will be ineffective in resolving problems. Nonetheless, institutions, such as legally enforceable contracts, are usually relatively specific; they thus may induce clear ex-ante expectations about actors' likely strategies under circumstances that are foreseen and addressed by the institution [17] and hence a bidding factor of trust. Formal institutions may help actors to engage in tightly defined transactions with a wide variety of other actors that are not part of the same community, as long as the latter actors are subject to the appropriate institutions and the same third-party enforcer [17]. In contrast, if the created the conditions henceforth institutions may for trust becomes fluid it may result into generation of opportunistic behaviour among actors and hence failure to fulfilling of the ax-ante commitments.

Despite significant gains in understanding both micro and the macro phenomena of trust [21-26], however gaps remain in the literature, particularly with regard to understanding how policy fluidity may trigger changes in trust levels especially among youth farming households. In addition, it is also possible that trust may not have the same predictors in all countries, thereby underscoring the investigation of its determinants in various countries [27]. Historical and cultural backgrounds contribute to variations in trust among different societies and economic cooperation [28]. According to [17], the existence of institutions in common social settings can affect the trustworthiness of the actors in those situations in such a way as to create ongoing relationships of trust among those actors. The present paper assesses impact of agricultural policy fluidity on youths' trustworthiness in abiding to contracts with private investors in the coffee sector in Tanzania.

### 2.2. Measurement of Trust

Measurement of trust among coffee farmers was based on the descriptions of trust by [2] but using the outcome of the untruthfulness in terms of quantity of coffee collected

through cooperatives attached with loan repayment albeit the loophole of diverging brought about by regulatory framework fluidity. In his explanations, he came up with a so-called encapsulated interest account of trust, which seeks to define more precisely the relationship between trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation. Trust, as [2] defines it, is a three-part phenomenon: X trusts Y with regard to matter Z. Trust can vary in each of these dimensions: the person trusting, the person being trusted, and the matter at issue in the trust relationship. I trust you, for example, with regard to the \$10 that I lent you at lunchtime yesterday; I may not trust you with my life savings. I may not trust another friend enough to lend him \$10 for lunch; you, in contrast, might. In [2]'s account, trust involves beliefs concerning interest, as broadly defined. I trust you about a certain matter to the extent that I believe that your interest encapsulates mine with regard to that matter. Finally, where the interests of two parties are consonant for reasons that have nothing to do with their particular relationship, it is difficult to see how trust meaningfully applies. Authors are aware that trust has been measured based on the perception in a World Values Survey by using a statement, 'generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?' [29]. While these survey questions are interesting, [30] express that they are also vague, abstract, and hard to interpret. Other scholars measure trust and trustworthiness by conducting experiments with monetary rewards (examples: 30-32). However, authors of this paper have conceptualized a quantitative measurement of trust by looking at the true outcome of the trust of farmers in term of the quantity of coffee collected to private investors or farmers groups in the realm of coffee marketing regulatory framework fluidity.

Following Trust Game [31], trust game is designed to measure trust in economic transactions. The first player, the investor, has provided loans to farmers in terms of inputs and coffee processing machines on a contractual basis through their groups to pay back such loans after selling coffee in the following selling season. With this context, authors extend the application of the trust game by using a true scenario to determine the outcome of the trustee due to loopholes created by policy fluidity. The second player, the trustees (coffee farmers through their groups) decided to apply for a loan from investors to pay back during harvesting. In measuring trust based on the reduced quantity of coffee collected by youth relative to elders, the following assumptions were set.

The trend of quantity of coffee produced has remained relatively constant for several years. This implies that any reduction of the quantity of coffee collected is due to mistrust whereby farmers diverted coffee to avoid loan repayment.

Second, coffee farmers are allowed to collect coffee at any cooperative regardless of membership and hence youths can collect coffee to other cooperatives even in nearby villages. In connection with the game theory, trust is a risky move

because it goes against the Trustee's self-interest to return money because of opportunistic behaviours ameliorated by change in regulation. But trusting can subsequently show if the Trustee is willing to sacrifice self-interest to satisfy a moral obligation [31]. With that regard, formal institutions are very important to abide by trustees' payback accordingly [32]. In the general farmers groups- private investor loan payback system, farmers are obliged to collect coffee to the groups or cooperatives for selling purposes and then deductions are made per kg of collected coffee with respect to the value of loan the specific farmer received. And this is done according to a formal contract guided by certain laws and policies that they must abide them. In Tanzania and elsewhere, cooperative policies are of course strongly influenced by the relationship between cooperatives and the state.

### ***2.3. Recent Government Directives on Coffee Marketing***

Local socio-economic cooperation arrangements can contribute to the development of adequate solutions which can compensate for the negative impacts of globalization, agriculture being one of the specific areas [5]. In recent years, Tanzania has been experiencing onset decrees on different regulatory frameworks including for coffee marketing which this paper refers to as policy fluidity which they are likely to affect the behaviours of actors in the specific value chain. In the 2017/2018 coffee marketing season, the government of Tanzania came up with an onset decree (as detailed in Table 1 below) that sought to improve efficiency of coffee marketing. However, such changes are hypothesized by this paper that such changes created loopholes for coffee farmers to practice dishonesty with regard to pre-established synergy between them through their groups and private investors in the coffee value chain. Before the decree, farmers were used to receiving financial and service loans from private investors through farmers groups with expectation of paying back through deductions to be made in the next coffee marketing season whereby it was mandatory for farmers to sell coffee through their cooperatives/ groups. However, the decree required coffee collection to be done through cooperatives only and therefore; private traders and farmers' groups lost their power to buy coffee directly from farmers. Onset changes in regulatory framework; three scenarios are likely to occur; first actors may continue with ex-ante arrangement fully, second, they may partially commit to implement the agreements or may avoid the ex-ante commitment involved in subcontracting and selling outside the firm. If they make the second and third choices, they are clearly breaching the trust anchored in the formal institutions which at this point are too fluid to impose the punishment. Notwithstanding, while such decree was effected, it implies that such modus operandi of collecting debts by private investors and farmers groups had completely changed and such changes created a loophole for dishonest farmers to deflect from paying back the loan.

**Table 1.** Government Directives on marketing for the 2018/19 coffee season.

New rules/regulations (2017/2018 onwards)	Previous rules and regulations (before 2017/2018 season)
Coffee will be collected from the farmers by the cooperative societies only. Farmer's groups and private traders will not be allowed to collect coffee from farmers	Farmers groups, cooperatives and private traders could collect/buy coffee from farmers
After collecting coffee from farmers, Cooperatives will take coffee for processing and later selling at the auction.	All actors mentioned above could take coffee for processing at the curing factories
Private traders will be required to purchase coffee at the auction in Moshi	Private traders were licensed to purchase coffee from farmers
Estates and plantation must sell their coffee at the TCB auction in Moshi, but those with longer-term contact, the TCB will prepare special arrangements	Estates and plantation exported coffee directly

## 2.4. Trust Among Youths

In the globalized world, it is marked that older people may differ from younger individuals in their overall attitudes, behaviors and predispositions [33-35]. Accordingly, trust increases almost linearly with the increase in age [35-37]. Moreover, it is unclear how age might affect individuals' truthfulness with respect to cooperation or contractual arrangement in the face of policy fluidity. The current paper is based on the government directives of coffee marketing which the main key issues were restriction of private traders from buying coffee from farmers and farmers groups to be dissolved and become cooperatives provided they comply with the cooperatives' registration requirements. In view, clustering groups has proved more effective with elders and women than with youth and men, because elders and women are more likely to repay the loan and they are thus more trustful [38]. This paper intended to examine the extent to which youth farming households collected coffee dishonestly to cooperatives mandated to collect debts for private investors and farmers groups relative to elders.

## 3. Methodology

### 3.1. Data Description

The analysis is based on data before the government decree of the 2017/2018 coffee season and after the decree. From 2017/18, the government of Tanzania came up with an onset decree that sought to improve efficiency of coffee marketing. The staggered timing in the transition from one set option to another provided a plausibly exogenous source of variation that can help us identify the impact of onset government decree on farmers' decision not supplying coffee to their cooperatives which they offered them with different services with expectation to repay for them in the next season, which is what we mean throughout by the term moral hazard. Data contains the coffee collected through cooperatives for both with contractual arrangement and without contractual arrangement to make clear cutoff of the two groups. Group one contains cooperatives and farmers with contractual arrangement which is referred to as a treatment group since onset government decree had high intensity of creating moral hazard behaviours among these farmers. Group two includes coffee farmers whose cooperatives had no contractual arrangement with farmers and are referred to as control groups. The data also contain relatively rich demographic information,

including age, gender, annual earnings, household size, and main source of income, religion, and household size, coffee farming experience, location, extension services received, coffee variety and access for financial services other than private companies for control factors. For rigorous selection of the groups, matching was applied in order to have two groups with similar characteristics except treatment indicator. This was done to clear the contention by [39] that the choice of a comparison group may be unclear either due to an ambiguous functional form in the pretreatment trend, lack of balance in the distribution of covariates between the treatment and comparison groups, or lack of overlap. Matching may be particularly useful in cases where researchers are reluctant to impose a functional form on time series data.

Data used were collected from coffee farmers and their respective cooperatives. Cooperatives and farmers were randomly selected whereby a total of 46 cooperatives were found to have rich data useful in analyzing the impact of government decree on moral hazard behaviour among coffee farmers. Using whether a cooperative had contractual arrangement or not, cooperatives were classified into two groups; cooperative with contractual arrangement (treatment-highly susceptible to defaulting famers from collecting coffee because they had received loans during previous season) and farmers group without contractual arrangement (control-stable since farmers had no incentive of selling coffee through other market channel). A total of 26 cooperatives were identified. In addition, the paper is based on 562 coffee farming households interviewed in Mbeya, Songwe and Ruvuma regions. The data were collected through questionnaire survey whereby about 202 youth farmers (treatment group) and 360 elders (control) were interviewed.

### 3.2. Data Analysis

#### 3.2.1. Theoretical and Empirical Frameworks

Consider a group of  $N$  members of farmers, both youths and elders acquiring services from private investors through their groups/cooperatives. Based on this objective of this paper, farmers are categorized into two groups; youth farming households and elder coffee farming households. For the purpose of this paper, youth is defined as young men and women from the age group between 15 and 35 years old [40]. With this regard, there are two types of farmers: farmers with age group of 15 to 35 and elders. Assuming that the level of production among coffee farmers remains relatively constant over some years with quantity ( $Q$ ) and they allowed

collecting coffee at farmers groups regardless of being youth or elder in similar trend. With distrust among youths, the present paper hypothesizes that, youths will deliver less than pre-agreed with their groups/cooperatives (CFG) and that more to other groups relative to elder farming households. It is assumed that, dishonest among youths arises because of onset changes in regulatory framework which create loopholes as farmers' obligations to comply are no longer lawful since laws have changed. Together, the collective efforts of farmers makes them collect to the cooperative from which they secured loan/ or any other services  $\alpha$  ( $N_A$ )= $N_A/N$ , where  $N_A$  denotes the number of farmers selecting action A. Overall, quantity is an increasing function of collective effort with respect to low moral hazard behaviour, but the effort level of each individual member is not revealed to the cooperative other than by random chance. Notice that each member received  $\alpha(N_A)$ , that is, the patronage with expectation to deliver quantity of coffee to cooperative as per general trend, which, generally was provided by private investor. The present chapter measures moral hazard behaviour in terms of farmers declining supplying coffee to their cooperatives which they received loan in terms of inputs conditioned to payback in due of coffee collection and these cooperatives had secured funding from private investors as discussed in the following paragraph.

Following [41], the standard moral hazard model assumes that the principal (private investor) cannot directly observe the effort level of the agent (farmer through farmer groups). Once a contract has been signed the agent must choose between  $n$  possible actions  $a_1, \dots, a_n$ . These actions produce one among  $m$  outcomes which we may denote  $x_1, \dots, x_m$ . Assume further that when the agent chooses action  $a_i$ , the principal observes the outcome  $x_j$  with a probability  $p_{ij}$  that is positive. The agent receives a benefit  $w_j$  for supplying coffee to other cooperative (positive outcome to farmer of dishonest behaviour created by change in regulation) when the principal observes the outcome  $x_j$  [41]. The income for the principal is  $(x_j - w_j)$ . The specification for the Agent's von Neumann Morgenstern utility function [42] can be written as:  $u(w) - a$ ,  $u$  is increasing and concave. Assuming neutrality for the principal as in most of the literature, his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is written as  $\mu(w) - a$ , where  $\mu$  is increasing and concave. Assuming neutrality for the principal as in most of the literature, his von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is written as  $(x - w)$  [42]. According to [42], when the principal offers a contract  $w_j$  the agent's utility maximization problem can be written as:

$$\text{Max}_{i=1, \dots, n} (\sum_{j=1}^m p_{ij} \mu(w_j) - a_i) \quad (1)$$

If the Agent chooses  $a_i$ , then the  $(n-1)$  incentive constraints (IC) is

$$(\sum_{j=1}^m p_{ij} \mu(w_j) - a_i) \geq (\sum_{j=1}^m p_{kj} \mu(w_j) - a_k) \quad \text{IC}_k \quad (2)$$

where  $k=1, \dots, n$  and  $k \neq i$ .

The agents' utility maximization problem is also subject to the following (individual rationality (IR) constraint)

participation constraint:

$$(\sum_{j=1}^m p_{ij} \mu(w_j) - a_i) \geq \underline{\mu}, \text{IR} \quad (3)$$

where  $\underline{\mu}$  is the utility derived from taking an outside option. The model is presented under individual receiving services from cooperative with expectation of collecting coffee through cooperative and then later a scenario under private investor. Following the theoretical framework stated above [42], the empirical strategy focuses on testing whether onset of coffee regulatory framework (RF) caused moral behaviour among coffee farmers and other particular covariates (control variables), vector  $X=(x_1, \dots, x_n)$  are associated with the incidence of moral hazard. The proxy for onset change in the regulatory framework is whether a particular cooperative had a contract with a private investor. In this case, it is assumed that those changes created the loophole for farmers to reduce the quantity of coffee collected through cooperative services.

### 3.2.2. Formalizing the Counterfactual Approach

Given the explanation above, the Difference-in-Differences (DID) method was found to be an appropriate method for impact evaluation. DID explores the time dimension of the data to define the counterfactuals. It requires having data for both treated and control groups, before and after the treatment takes place. It estimates the impact of the intervention by comparing the difference in outcomes between treated and control groups in some period after the participants have completed the programme with the difference that existed before the programme [43, 44]. It acknowledges the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the selection into treatment, ensuring the estimation of the true ATT if this selection bias is constant over time as it is differenced out [45]. Longitudinal data, in which the same individuals are followed over time, is usually used but it can also be applied to repeated cross-sectional data. Compared to cross-section estimators it has the advantage of controlling for differences in unobservable characteristics that are fixed over time, i.e. a specific form of selection on unobservable. For this case two groups indexed by treatment status  $T=0,1$  where 0 indicates coffee farmers/cooperatives who/which is not likely to be affected in trust behaviour by government decree on coffee marketing (control group-elders farming households) and 1 indicate youth farming households assumed to become dishonest due to change in regulation (treatment group). Assume that we observe individuals in two time periods,  $t=0,1$  where 0 indicates a time period before the treatment group receives treatment (pre-treatment) and 1 indicates a time period after the decree (post-treatment). Every observation is indexed by the letter  $1, \dots, N$ ; individuals will typically have two observations each, one pre-treatment and one post-treatment. For the sake of notation let  $\bar{y}$  and  $\bar{y}'$  be sample averages of the outcome for the treatment group before and after treatment, respectively, and  $\bar{y}_c$  and  $\bar{y}'_c$  be the corresponding sample averages of the outcomes for the control group. Subscripts correspond to time period and subscripts to the treatment status. The difference in difference or double difference estimator is defined as the difference in average outcome in

the treatment group before and after treatment minus the difference in average outcome in the control group before and after treatment [42].

$$\widehat{ATT}_{DID} = (\bar{Y}_1^T - \bar{Y}_0^T) - (\bar{Y}_1^C - \bar{Y}_0^C) \quad (4)$$

The difference estimator for the pre-period is used to estimate the permanent difference  $\hat{\alpha}$ , which is then subtracted away from the post-period estimator to get  $\delta$ .

### 3.2.3. Assumptions

1. The unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant and is cancelled out by comparing the before and after situations;
2. Difference-in-difference (DID) estimators assume that in absence of treatment the difference between control (B) and treatment (A) groups would be constant or 'fixed' over time. Identification based on DID relies on the parallel trends assumption, which states that the treatment group, absent the reform, would have followed the same time trend as the control group (for the outcome variable of interest) [46].

### 3.2.4. Econometric Modeling of the Outcome

Policy indicates the year (2017/18) when the policy is implemented, and variable of our interest is cooperatives/farmers affected by the policy.

$$E(Y_1^0 | D = 1) - E(Y_0^0 | D = 1) = \alpha + \sigma^0 + Y - \alpha - Y = \sigma^0 \quad (8)$$

$$E(Y_1^0 | D = 0) - E(Y_0^0 | D = 0) = \alpha + \sigma^0 - \alpha = \sigma^0 \quad (9)$$

i.e. the pre and post period differences in baseline outcomes is the same ( $\delta^0$ ) regardless if individuals are assigned to the treatment group ( $D=1$ ) or control group ( $D=0$ ).

Another important assumption is the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption, which implies that there should be no spillover effects between the treatment and control groups, as the treatment effect would then not be identified [46].

## 4. Results and Discussions

### 4.1. Impact of Agricultural Policy Fluidity on Coffee Collection at Cooperative Level

Before 2018, coffee collection and marketing were largely dominated by farmers groups and they sold coffee to private traders. After the 2017/2018 coffee season, the government institutionalized establishment of cooperatives, whereby most of the farmer's groups were transformed to cooperatives. The fieldwork revealed that many cooperatives were at an infant stage with the exception of very few cooperatives in Ruvuma and Mbeya. With this regard, the cooperative had remained very fragmented, fragile in the coffee collection and very risky if financed. During their establishment, different companies and financial institutions contracted them to supply different services like inputs and money for operations. After then, farmers received such inputs and first installment for coffee sales. In the next season, while farmers used inputs, say from,

$$GDCM \begin{cases} = 0 \text{ before decree (2017/18)} \\ = 1 \text{ after decree (2018/19)} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

$$GDCM \begin{cases} = 0 \text{ elders farming households} \\ = 1 \text{ youth farming households} \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

where by GDCM is Government decree on coffee marketing. The outcome  $Y_i$  is modeled by the following equation

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma t_i + \rho(T_i * t_i) + \sum_{i=2}^n \beta_i X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (7)$$

Where the coefficients given by  $\hat{\alpha}$ ,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $\gamma$  and  $\rho$  are all unknown parameters and  $\varepsilon_i$  is a random, unobserved "error" term which contains all determinants of  $Y_i$  which our model omits. By inspecting the equation you should be able to see that the coefficients have the following interpretation,  $\alpha$  = constant term,  $\beta_1$  = treatment group specific effect (to account for average permanent differences between treatment and control),  $\beta_{2-6}$  = where  $X_i$  denotes the other observable factors (control variables) affecting the farmers decision to default from selling coffee to the cooperatives where they obtained inputs on loan,  $\gamma$  = time trend common to control and treatment groups and  $\rho$  = true effect of treatment.

Following [47], it can be expressed in terms of potential outcomes:

they then decided to supply coffee to other cooperatives leaving the cooperative with the inability to pay back the loan. For example, Table 2 indicates the trend collection of some cooperatives which experienced huge coffee collection defaults and those experienced a tremendous increase in the coffee collection just in a year. With this kind of coffee collection trend, it implies that the determination of coffee collection does not indicate the capacity of the cooperatives. Consistently, it was found that many farmers had remained with the concept of having farmer groups. As indicated in Table 2, changes in coffee collection at cooperative level were observed with increase in quantity of coffee collected at the cooperative which had no contractual arrangement with private investors while cooperatives which had contractual arrangement experienced decline in coffee collection. Albeit not statistically significant, before the enactment of changes, cooperatives with contractual arrangement used to collect more coffee compared to cooperatives without contractual arrangement with mean difference of about 4,801kg before baseline (first point for parallel trends assumption) and 4,665 (at the baseline). However, after implementation of the government decree on coffee marketing, coffee collection at cooperatives with contractual arrangement was reduced significantly to reduce the capacity of these cooperatives paying back the loan from private investors. As indicated in the table below, coffee collection declined by 20.13%. On the other hand, cooperatives without contracts with private investors experienced an increase in coffee collection by 30%.

It should be noted that, all coffee cooperatives in Tanzania are allowed to collect and market coffee of the non-member and hence creating the loophole for non-truthful farmers to sell coffee to other cooperative albeit he/she knows that it is important to collect to the respective cooperative to enable it payback the services receive from private investors. Generally, the onset change in coffee marketing created a moral hazard among coffee farmers whereby cooperatives which had served their members with inputs and other services like processing experienced huge decline in collection of coffee on average of

9,694kg of coffee parchment. On the other hand cooperatives which had not provided inputs on loan experienced an increase in coffee collection on average of 13,115kg. This implies that farmers with loans from their respective cooperatives decided to sell coffee through other cooperatives leading to their own cooperatives' problems of failing to pay back loans from private investors. Based on the DID approach, changes in coffee marketing impacted cooperatives with contracts with private investors by Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) of 22,809kg.

*Table 2. Difference in Difference Results at Cooperative Level.*

	2016/17 (Parallel trend point)	2017/18 Before enactment of the decree	After the decree	Difference	% change in coffee collection	P Value (DID)
Cooperatives with contract	56,146	48,150	38,456	-9,694	-0.201	0.000***
Cooperatives without contract	51,345	43,485	56,600	13,115	0.301	
Difference	4,801	4,665	18,144	22,809		
P Value	0.000	0.000				
P Value (parallel trend pre and baseline data)	0.2742					

#### **4.2. Econometrics Results on the Impact of Agricultural Policy Fluidity on Trust Among Youths**

Table 3, Panel A provides the estimated overall impact of agricultural policy fluidity on trust among youth coffee farmers relative to elders counterparts in Tanzania. The results for OLS model with the interaction term and other covariates as independent variables, and coffee collected by farmers at their respective cooperatives as dependent variable indicate that on set change of government policy through government decree on coffee marketing of 2017/18 promoted mistrust behaviour among youth coffee farmers relative to elders by collecting less coffee to their cooperatives which they had provided them with inputs and other services with expectation of repaying such loan after selling their coffee.

Based on the output of the regression model, the estimate of DID (Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) statistic is 18.2kg of coffee parchment and is significant at 5% level i.e. since P-value=0.000. In other words, changes in coffee marketing due to government decree caused mistrust behaviour of decreasing quantity of coffee collected to the cooperatives with contract with private investors by 18.2kg of coffee parchment over 1 year period, relative to elders coffee farmers. This affirms [48] who found that some farmers do not trust millers as they complained millers deliberately record low levels of sucrose in their cane as a strategy to reduce the payment to producers. This doubt by farmers implies that they have no confidence in the millers and therefore suspect opportunistic behavior by the millers. The perceived opportunistic behavior and associated power position of the millers is not conducive to strong cooperation between the actors in the chain [48]. This perception often leads to acts of "counter opportunism" by growers. In addition, [49] report that a pervasive lack of trust is reported between actors and institutions throughout the agricultural innovation system, hindering the potential for collective action. In addition, [50]

revealed that trust among young farmers in an exemplary rural area of Greece was very low.

Further, interaction between treatment on treated and time significantly influenced farmers to reduce the quantity of coffee collected to their respective cooperatives by 2.6kg coffee parchment relative to coffee farmers whose cooperatives had no contract private investors. Besides, [51] concluded that pro-enforcement reforms play a significant role in signaling conditions of level playing field with organization and indeed, the lack of trust calls for the introduction of formal rules of the game, i.e., the enforcement of regulation to prevent opportunistic behaviors. With specific to trust among youth farmers, contracts results by [52] farmers trusted investors regardless of age, years working, or even the reputation. Both coffee farming practices (coffee farm size, cost of input used, coffee varieties and at least four Good Agricultural Practices (GAP)) and household characteristics (education level of the household head (years), marital status of the household head, household size, distance to coffee collection centres, level of income from other sources, relative/friend with cooperative leaders, access to extension services) were found not influencing farmers moral hazard behaviour of defaulting from collecting coffee to their cooperatives. However, some covariates were co-founders. This implies that such covariates were found influencing youths' decisions to default from collecting their coffee to the respective cooperatives. For examples, youth used to practice at least four GAP defaulted from collecting coffee to their respective cooperatives in relation to those who were not practising GAP were relative to elders. Table 3 indicates that farmers form cooperatives with contracts with private investors and whose coffee were processed at CPUs maintained collecting coffee to their cooperatives relatives to the farmers whose cooperatives had no contractual arrangement with private investors.

**Table 3.** *Impact of agricultural policy fluidity on trust among youth coffee farmers.*

Variables	Coefficients	Pr(> t )
Panel A: Impact of agricultural policy fluidity on trust		
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT)	-18.2	0.000***
Time	-2.6	0.81019
Government decree*Time	-2.7	0.0585*
Intercept	-673	0.000***
Panel B: Heterogeneous impacts by farming practice		
Coffee farm size	-0.003	0.1625
Cost of input used	0.232	0.157
Coffee varieties	0.274	0.414
At least four Good Agricultural Practices (GAP)	0.122	0.030**
Panel C: Heterogeneous impacts by socioeconomic variables		
Education level of the household head (years)	0.179	0.445
Marital status of the household head	-0.004	0.183
Household size	0.014	0.873
Distance to coffee collection centres	-0.001	0.852
Distance to economic centre	-0.001*	0.011
Level of income from other sources	0.009	0.438
Relative/friend with cooperative leaders	0.016	0.344
Access to extension services	0.010	0.467
Coffee processing method (CPU=1, HP=0)	0.035	0.000***

\*p < 0.10, \*\*p < 0.05, \*\*\*p < 0.01, R<sup>2</sup>=0.6325, F-statistic: 13.97 p-value: 0.000\*\*\*.

## 5. Conclusion and Recommendations

Through a thorough and in-depth econometric analysis of cooperative based data and household survey data, it was found that the 2017/2018 government decree on coffee marketing ameliorated mistrust among youth farmers owed to repay loan relative to elders. The research shows that stability of policies/ institutions are binding factors to sustain existing trust among youth farmers and traders develop cooperation or draw on existing networks, allowing them to enter into new markets and increase incomes. Understanding the effect of policy fluidity on trust is very important in understanding how farmers can improve their well-being through stabilizing or increasing income, and increasing access to key resources while making a win-win condition between them and investors. This has attempted to answer one of the unanswered questions in the literature of trust; the linkage between trust and policy fluidity. The current conceptualization of the quantitative measurement of trust by looking at the true outcome of the trust of farmers in terms of the quantity of coffee collected to private investors or farmers groups in the realm of coffee marketing regulatory framework fluidity is novel. Albeit, aimed at determining trust among youths, yet has revealed understanding that policy fluidity created opportunistic behaviour among farmers but youths to large extent. That underpins the importance of stable policies in reducing risks to investors aiming at supporting farmers. It is explicitly that the formal legal system is very crucial to strengthening trust and hence sustaining farmers-investors relationships. This new perspective moves rather towards the direction of revisiting the role of the state in the rural development policies. With this regard strong and stable policies are paramount for sustained trust and honest among farmers so as the existing synergies between them and private

investors are maintained. It is recommended that since agricultural investments are long term, any change in agricultural policies, laws and regulations has to have preparatory phase to allow investors, cooperatives, farmers and government units participating in the value chain to determine possible negative effects and develop strategies of mitigating such effect. Cooperatives have to work with responsible department at district level to institutionalize mistrust measures restricting farmers from selling coffee to other cooperatives. One of the measures will be restricting cooperatives from receiving coffee from non-member farmer. They should help them to produce and use social capital efficiently as an instrument for development, thereby strengthening competitiveness since society is the only actor capable of generating social capital especially in times like those that rural areas are nowadays facing in Greece, during which the social dimension of an overall economic development cannot be ignored.

## References

- [1] José G., & Vargas-Hernández, J. G. (2008). Relationships between institutional Economics of Cooperation and the Political Economy of trust. *Brazilian political science review*. 3 (1): 35–56. <http://socialsciences.scielo.org/scielo.php>.
- [2] Hardin, R. (2002). *Trust and trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- [3] Hirsch, B., & Meyer, M. (2005). The trust decision in cooperation viewed from investment theoretic perspectives. Working paper, Otto Beisheim Graduate School of Management, Management Accounting and Management Control, in Vallendar, Germany.
- [4] Rousseau, D. M., Sitkin, R S., Burt, C B., & Camerar, C. (1998). Not so different after all: a cross-discipline view of trust. *Academy of Management Review*. 23 (3).



- [5] István, T., Katalin, G. T., & Zsolt, B. (2016). The role of trust in cooperation between farmers – the outcomes of a survey in Békés County. *Applied Studies in Agribusiness and Commerce* 6 (5): 105-114. DOI: 10.19041/Abstract/2012/5/18.
- [6] Sake, M. (1992). *Pnces, quallty and trust: inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan*. (Cambridge Um!crslty Press, Cambridge).
- [7] Jalil, A., & Iffat, R. (2017). The economic payoffs of trust: an empirical investigation from developing countries Robust to Jackknife coefficients distribution. *Social Indicators Research*, 11 (31), 1121–1144. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-0 16-1281-x.
- [8] Shah, S. S. (2019). On trust dynamics of economic growth, MPRA, paper No 94095. Germany: University Library of Munich. <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/94095/>
- [9] Arrow, K. J. (1972). Gifts and Exchanges. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 1 (4): 343–62.
- [10] Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2010). Inherited Trust and Growth. *American Economic Review* 100: 2060–2092. <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/aer.100.5.2060>
- [11] Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2013). Trust in government, policy effectiveness and the governance agenda. *Government at a glance 2013* (pp. 19–37). <https://ourworldindata.org/trust>.
- [12] Addai, I., Opoku-Agyeman, C., & Ghartey, H. T. (2013). An Exploratory Study of Religion and Trust in Ghana. *Journal of Social Indicators Research*. 110: 993–1012. DOI 10.1007/s11205-011-9969-4.
- [13] Morgan, R. M., & Hunt, D. S. (1994). The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing. *Journal of Marketing*. 58: 20-38. <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022242994058003 02>
- [14] Davis, K. (2008). Trust in the lives of young people: A conceptual framework to explore how youth make trust judgments. Project Report Series, Number 52. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255616318>
- [15] Shen, L., Su, C., Zheng, X., & Zhuang, G. (2019). Contract design capability as a trust enabler in the preformation phase of international relationships. *Journal of Business Research*, 95, 103-115.
- [16] Bohnet, I., Frey, B. S., & Huck, S. (2001). More order with less law: On contract enforcement, trust, and crowding. *American Political Science Review*, 95, 131–144.
- [17] Farrell, H., & Knight, J. (2003). Trust, institutions and institutional change: Industrial districts and the social capital hypothesis. *Politics and Society* 31 (4): 537-566.
- [18] World Bank. (2021). Regulation of Sectors and Regulatory Issues Impacting Public Private Partnerships. <https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/>
- [19] International Cooperative Alliance. (2020). Legal Framework Analysis. National Report-Tanzania. <https://coops4dev.coop/sites>
- [20] Urassa, C. G. (2014). The effect of the regulatory framework on the competitiveness of the dairy sector in Tanzania", *International Journal of Public Sector Management*, Vol. 27 Iss 4 pp. 296 – 305. DOI: 10.1108/IJPSM-08-2011-0100.
- [21] Costa, A. C. (2000). A Matter of Trust: Effects on the Performance and Effectiveness of Teams in Organizations. Utrecht: Kurt Lewin Instituut.
- [22] Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust propensity: a meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 92 (4): 909-927.
- [23] Dinesen, P. T., & Sønderskov, K. M. (2012). Trust in a time of increasing diversity: on the relationship between ethnic heterogeneity and generalized trust in Denmark from 1979 until today. *Scandinavian Political Studies* 35 (4): 273-294.
- [24] Dinesen, P. T., & Sønderskov, K. M. (2018). Ethnic diversity and social trust: a critical review of the literature and suggestions for a research agenda. In: E. M. Uslaner (ed.) *The Oxford Handbook on Social and Political Trust*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhdb/9780190274801.013.13.
- [25] Knack, S., & Zak, P. J. (2002). Building trust: public policy, interpersonal trust, and economic development. *Supreme Court Economic Review* 10: 91-107.
- [26] Letki, N. (2006). Investigating the roots of civic morality: trust, social capital, and institutional performance. *Political Behavior* 28 (4): 305-325.
- [27] Dilmaghani, M. (2017). Religiosity and social trust: Evidence from Canada. *Journal Review of Social Economy*. 75 (1): 49–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00346 764.2016.11868 20>.
- [28] Taormina, R. J. (2013). Measuring trust in China: Resolving Eastern and Western differences in concepts of trust. Presented at the Third Asian Conference of Psychology and the Behavioral Sciences (28–31 March) at Osaka, Japan.
- [29] World Values Survey. (2014). Official Questionnaire. <https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>
- [30] Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D. I., Scheinkman, J. A., & Soutter, C. (2000). Measuring Trust. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 811-846. <https://scholar.harvard.edu>.
- [31] Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History, *Games and Economic Behavior*, X (1995), 122–142.
- [32] Kreps, D. M. (1990). *Corporate Culture and Economic Theory in Perspectives on Positive Political Economy* (I. Alt and K. Shepsle, Eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- [33] Bal, P. M., de Lange, A. H., Ybema, J. F., Jansen, P. G., & Van der Velde, M. G. 2011. Age and trust as moderators in the relation between procedural justice and turnover: a large-scale longitudinal study. *Applied Psychology*. Vol. 60 No. 1, pp. 66-86.
- [34] Chang, J., O'Neill, G., & Travaglione, A. (2016). Demographic influences on employee trust towards managers. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis*. Vol. 24 No. 2, pp. 21-36.
- [35] Li, T and Fung, H. H. (2012). Age differences in trust: an investigation across 38 countries. *The Journals of Gerontology*, Vol. 68 No. 3, pp. 347-355.
- [36] Goel, S., & Karri, R. (2006). Entrepreneurs, effectual logic, and over-trust, *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, Vol. 30 No. 4, pp. 477-493.
- [37] Poulin, M. J., & Haase, C. M. (2015). Growing to trust: evidence that trust increases and sustains well-being across the life span, *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, March 2, doi: 10.1177/1948550615574301.

- [38] FAO. (2014). Youth and agriculture: key challenges and concrete solutions. [www.fao.org/publications](http://www.fao.org/publications).
- [39] Clair, T. T., & Cook, T. (2015). Difference-In-Differences Methods in Public Finance. *National Tax Journal*, June 2015, 68 (2), 319–338. doi/10.17310/ntj.2015.2.04.
- [40] URT. (2007). National Youth Development Policy. pg 33. <https://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Tanzania>
- [41] Salanie, B. (2000). *The Economics of contracts*. The MIT Press Cambridge, England.
- [42] Chichilnisky, G. (1985). Von Neumann: Morgenstern Utilities and Cardinal Preferences. *Mathematics of Operations Research*, Nov., 1985, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Nov., 1985), pp. 633-641. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3689431>
- [43] Gibbons, Charles E., Juan, C. S. S., & Urbancic, B. (2018). Broken or fixed effects? *Journal of Econometric Methods* 8 (1). <https://www.degruyter.com/view/journals/jem/8/1/article-2017>.
- [44] Wooldridge, J. M. (2005). Fixed-effects and related estimators for correlated random-coefficient and treatment-effect panel data models. *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87 (2): 385–90.
- [45] Kim, J. B., Pevzner, M., & Xin, X. (2019). Foreign institutional ownership and auditor choice: Evidence from worldwide institutional ownership. *Journal of International Business Studies*, 50, 83–110. 10.1057/s41267-018-0160-x.
- [46] Fredriksson, A., & de Oliveira, G. M. (2019). Impact evaluation using Difference-in-Differences. *Management Journal*. 54 (4): 519-532. DOI 10.1108/RAUSP-05-2019-0112.
- [47] Lechner, M. (2010). The Estimation of Causal Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods. Working paper series 2010 2010-28. <https://ideas.repec.org/p/usg/dp2010/2010-28.html>
- [48] Masuku, M. B. (2009). The role of trust in contract enforcement: An analysis of smallholder farmers and sugar millers in Swaziland. In *Institutional economics perspectives on African agricultural development*. ed. Johann F. Kirsten, Andrew R. Dorward, Colin Poulton, and Nick Vink. Chapter 6. Pp. 185-100. Washington, D. C.: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). <http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/129481>.
- [49] Lowitt, K., Hickey, G. M., Saint Ville, A., Raeburn, K., Thompson-Colón, T., Laszlo, S., & Phillip, L. E. (2015). Factors affecting the innovation potential of smallholder farmers in the Caribbean Community. *Regional Environmental Change* 15, 1367–1377 (2015). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-015-0805-2>
- [50] Koutsou, S., Partalidou, M., & Ragkos, A. (2014). Young farmers' social capital in Greece: Trust levels and collective actions. *Journal of Rural Studies*. 34: 204-211. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2014.02.002>.
- [51] Mariotti, S., & Marzano, R. (2021). The effects of competition policy, regulatory quality and trust on inward FDI in host countries. *Journal of International Business Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2021.101887>.
- [52] Newman, C., & Briggeman, B. C. (2016). Farmers' Perceptions of Building Trust. *International Food and Agribusiness Management Review*, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association. 19 (3): 1-20. DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.244672.